# Doc---NU Opener---Octas

## 1NC

### T-USfg

#### Interpretation---the resolution should define the division of Aff and Neg ground---it was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare---only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### The USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The core antitrust laws are The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend USFG action that substantially expands the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### Vote Neg:

#### 1. Fairness---the Neg should win on average 50% of the time---any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose---their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith.

#### 2. Clash---debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third- and fourth-line responses---that’s key to effective politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs---their interpretation explodes limits, makes the Aff conditional, and forces the Neg into concessionary ground.

### K

#### The 1AC’s critical affirmation has offered moralism when it needs to offer organization for Climate Maoism – refusal to seize the state from the capitalist class forecloses a dictatorship of the proletariat

Heron & Dean 20 (Kai Heron, editor at ROAR Magazine. Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. “Revolution or Ruin.” E-Flux. Journal #110 - June 2020. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/> //shree)

Let’s look at this third option more closely. To build towards an eco-communist revolution, we need to avoid both a politics of pure negation and a politics of “critical affirmation.” As Marx argued, revolutions need dialectics. They need us to find what Fredric Jameson calls the “dialectical ambivalence” in capitalism. This means training ourselves to locate aspects of the present that point beyond themselves and towards the communist horizon. Lenin did precisely this after the outbreak of the First World War. Rather than joining with the majority of the socialist parties of the Second International in capitulating to imperialist war, and rather than wallowing in melancholia following the betrayal of so many of his German comrades as they voted for war credits, Lenin saw in the war an opportunity for revolutionary advance. Those interested in the emancipation of the working class needed to fight not for peace but for the dialectical conversion of nationalist war to civil war. The war, and the collapse of the Second International, was the opportunity for something new.

What would it mean to think dialectically about the GND? We think it would mean stripping the policy’s reformist content away from its revolutionary form. For decades environmental movements in the capitalist core have busied themselves fighting for local solutions to global problems: cooperatives, local currencies, urban agriculture, and ethical consumerism. As these experiments blossomed, the climate crisis continued unabated. More pipelines were built, more indigenous land was stolen, more fires raged, and more species flickered out of existence.

In their form the GND and GIR put localism aside. Both recognize that the climate crisis demands a state-led, centrally planned, and global response. They take for granted that we need a state to intervene on behalf of nature and workers against capital. The fact that the GND and GIR promise to do this is what makes capitalists fear them. Those who are excited about the promise of the GND—such as Riofrancos—have similarly turned towards the state as a terrain of struggle and a locus of power. Consciously or not, these movements have learned from the failures of Climate Camp, Occupy, and the Movement of Squares. It is not enough to suspend the normal running of things. Taking responsibility means taking power and organizing society in what Marx called the interests of “freely associated workers,” or more controversially, the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The struggles to implement the GND and GIR tell us that environmentalists are increasingly aware of the need to seize the state—and the need to develop a fighting organization with the capacity to do so.

Against State Denialism

Ironically, at almost the precise moment that progressive movements have become conscious of the necessity of a climate response operating at the necessary scale, the Marxist left has taken a state-phobic turn. Consider “disaster communism.” Confronted with the choice between ruin or revolution, disaster communism opts for ruin as the path to revolution—without considering the form of association necessary to ensure that the revolution ushers in a more equal, just, and sustainable world rather than insulated groups struggling with each other over resources. In lieu of the revolutionary subject emphasized in the Marxist tradition, disaster communism turns to climate breakdown as the agent of history.

Drawing on Rebecca Solnit’s book A Paradise Built in Hell, a study of how practices of mutual aid and collectivity arise in the aftermath of crises, disaster communists argue that we do not need to seize the state because the state will be washed away, along with the capitalist system itself, as the full force of the climate crisis crashes down around us. While Solnit emphasizes the ephemerality of “disaster communities,” disaster communists ask how these communities might be sustained and even flourish well beyond the punctual point of a climatic disaster wrought by capitalism. Theirs is a vision of communism arising, triumphantly, from capital’s ashes. Vision may be too strong a term here: for the most part, disaster communism is a hope, a screen covering over the need for organization and planning at a scale that can produce a form of life suitable for billions of people and nonhuman species.

Responses to the Covid-19 pandemic illustrate the point. Even as mobilized volunteers and mutual aid can meet real needs by distributing meals, assisting neighbors, and coordinating webinars, they are inadequate to the most demanding tasks of developing and administering tests for the virus, securing hospital beds in intensive care units, producing and distributing respirators, and providing adequate protective equipment at the necessary scale. Mutual aid is inspiring, but it’s not enough—it can’t stop the hoarders and profiteers, pay hospital bills and unemployment insurance, release prisoners and detainees. It doesn’t scale, particularly when the prevailing logic comes from the market. That capital accumulation takes place through dispossession as well as exploitation brings home the real limit of mutual aid: poor and working people do not own the means of production and therefore production does not meet social needs.

Furthermore, in extreme capitalist countries like the US and the UK, social and political diversity means that many do not voluntarily comply with public health recommendations. Employers insist that employees come to work. Students spend spring break at the beach. Individuals approach their own situations in terms of exceptions, reasons why they don’t need to comply with directives. Orders from the state don’t eliminate all these exceptions. But they reduce them substantially, most significantly by preventing employers from requiring workers to put themselves at risk. Were the state used as an instrument of working class power, it would, at a minimum, guarantee that workers would continue to be paid, that the health and well-being of people would be the focus of government attention. The pandemic demonstrates a truth that the left’s responses to climate change have been slow to acknowledge: global problems require a centrally planned response with all the tools that are at the disposal of the state. Failing to seize hospitals, industry, banks, and logistical networks from the capitalist class results in needless death—and gives a green light to disaster capitalism.

Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright’s 2018 book Climate Leviathan provides another state-phobic response to the climate crisis. Mann and Wainwright predict four possible resolutions to the climate crisis. The first is “Climate Leviathan.” This is a global sovereign power that would act in the interests of capitalist states and global capital to limit the effects of climate breakdown. This is effectively the scenario hoped for by Chakrabarty. The second is “Climate Behemoth.” Here, states cannot agree to constitute a global sovereign power and so the crisis is tackled by international capital in the interests of international capital. The third is “Climate Mao.” In this scenario a single authoritarian sovereign power, most likely China, leads global mitigation and adaptation efforts. Finally, their fourth and preferred scenario is “Climate X.” This would be a so-far-nonexistent social movement that struggles to resolve the crisis in a way that is simultaneously anti-capitalist and anti-sovereign.

Alyssa Battistoni and Patrick Bigger have already written compelling Marxist critiques of Climate Leviathan. We don’t need to rehearse them here. We note, however, that responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have resembled Climate Behemoth and Climate Mao. While the US, UK, and EU have been slow to use state power to coordinate either within or among the themselves, instead following the dictates and interests of capital in their structuring of economic responses to the pandemic, China has modeled both rigorous state action with respect to quarantines and international leadership with respect to provision of medical aid. What’s important for our argument here is that Mann and Wainwright’s state denialism prevents them from conceiving the state as a form for the collective power of working people, an instrument through which we remake the economy in the service of human and nonhuman life.

Jasper Bernes offers a third state-phobic Marxist response to the climate crisis. A proponent of communization theory, Bernes argues that communism means “the immediate abolition of money and wages, of state power, and of administrative centralization.” Absent something like a state, how is a just response to the climate crisis even possible? Should we assume that it will spontaneously emerge as a result of disparate local disaster communisms? Should we assume that access to food, water, living space, and capacities for self-defense will be equally distributed, that by some miracle the immediate abolition of money and wages will leave everyone in the same position? The pandemic gives us insight into the inability of the communization approach to respond to catastrophe: when millions who have been dependent on the wage are without it, they require centralized state power to seize the means of production and distribution and administer both on the scale necessary to meet social needs. The issue isn’t the power of the state. It’s the class wielding state power.

#### Capitalism ensures climate apartheid and extinction

Heron & Dean 20 (Kai Heron, editor at ROAR Magazine. Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. “Revolution or Ruin.” E-Flux. Journal #110 - June 2020. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/> //shree)

We know how the first paragraph begins. We’ve read about the changing climate for over twenty years, infrequently at first and then daily until we couldn’t deny it any longer. The world is burning. The oceans are heating up and acidifying. Species are dying in the Sixth Great Extinction. Koalas have replaced polar bears as the charismatic species whose dwindling numbers bring us to tears. Millions are displaced and on the move, only to be met with fences, borders, and death.

We’ve read the news and it keeps getting worse. As pandemics spread, as the climate crisis continues unabated, the imperatives of capital prevent state action on anything but protecting banks and corporations. Since 1988, when human-induced climate change was officially recognized by the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the oil and gas sector has doubled its contribution to global warming. The industry emitted as much greenhouse gas over the twenty-eight years after 1988 as it had in the 237 years since the beginning of the industrial age. Regular reports announce that the atmospheric impact of these emissions is manifesting faster than scientists previously expected. The IPCC clock tells us that we have eleven years to prevent warming from rising more than 1.5 degrees above preindustrial levels. Some places on earth already hit that mark in the summer of 2019. “Climate change”—that innocuous moniker preferred by Republican political consultant Frank Lutz and adopted by the George W. Bush administration because “global warming” seemed too apocalyptic—has moved from seeming far away and impossible to being here, now, and undeniable. This has not stopped the United States and Canada from providing economic relief funds in the wake of coronavirus to oil and gas companies.

Those least responsible for climate change, those who have suffered the most from capitalism’s colonizing and imperial drive, are on the frontlines of the climate catastrophe. How to find clean water amidst never-ending drought? How to gather needed herbs, food, and firewood amidst rapid deforestation? How to survive the floods and fires? Centuries of colonialism, exploitation, and war undermine people’s capacities to survive and thrive, hitting poor people, women, children, people with disabilities, already disadvantaged racialized and national minorities, and the elderly hardest of all. According to a UN report, “We risk a ‘climate apartheid’ scenario where the wealthy pay to escape overheating, hunger and conflict while the rest of the world is left to suffer.” Capitalism has always permitted some to flourish by forcing others to fight for survival. The climate crisis—and now the coronavirus—intensifies these dynamics into a global class war. In Marx’s words, “ruin or revolution is the watchword” for our times.

#### Vote neg for Maoist ethics against capitalist apartheid – only unifying the colonial underclass through a People’s Liberation Army can destroywhite capitalist civilization and institute a World Black Dictatorship

Kelley and Etsche 99 (Robin D.G. Kelley, Robin Davis Gibran Kelley (born March 14, 1962) is the Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA.[1][2] From 2006 to 2011, he was Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California (USC),[3] and from 2003 to 2006 he was the William B. Ransford Professor of Cultural and Historical Studies at Columbia University. From 1994 to 2003, he was a professor of history and Africana Studies at New York University (NYU) as well the chairman of NYU's history department from 2002 to 2003.; and Betsy Etsche, Assistant Prof of American Studies at University of Kansas. “Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution.” Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society. V1 N4. P18-20 //shree) Note: RAM = Revolutionary Action Movement founded by Freeman, Max Stanford, and Wanda Marshall.

Maoism’s emphasis on revolutionary ethics and moral transformation, in theory at least, resonated with black religious traditions (as wells as American Protestantism more generally), and like the Nation of Islam, black Maoists preached self-restraint, order, and discipline. It is quite possible that in the midst of a counterculture that embodied elements of hedonism and drug use, a new wave of student and working-class radicals found Maoist ethics attractive. On his return from China, Robert Williams – in many respects RAM’s founding father – insisted that all young black activists “undergo personal and moral transformation. There is a need for a stringent revolutionary code of moral ethics. Revolutionaries are instruments of righteousness.” For black revolutionaries, the moral and ethical dimension of Mao’s thought centered on the notion of personal transformation. It was a familiar lesson, embodied in the lives of Malcolm X and (later) George Jackson: the idea that one possesses the revolutionary will to transform himself. (These narratives are almost exclusively male despite the growing number of memoirs by radical black women). Whether or not RAM members lived by the “Code of Cadres,” Maoist ethics ultimately served to reinforce Malcolm’s status as a revolutionary role model.

RAM’s twelve-point program called for the development of freedom schools, national black student organizations, rifle clubs, black farmer cooperatives – not just for economic development but to keep “community and guerilla forces going for a while” – and a liberation guerilla army made up of youth and unemployed. RAM placed special emphasis on internationalism, pledging support for national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well as the adoption of “Pan-African socialism.” In line with Cruse’s seminal essay, “Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American,” RAM members saw themselves as colonial subjects fighting a “colonial war at home.” As Stanford wrote in an internal document, titled “Projects and Problems of the Revolutionary Movement.” (1964), “RAM’s position is that the Afro-American is not a citizen of the USA, denied his rights, but rather he is a colonial subject enslaved. This position says that the Black people in the USA are a captive nation suppressed and that their fight is not for integration into the white community but one of national liberation.”

As colonial subjects with a right to self-determination, RAM saw Afro-America as a de facto member of the nonaligned nations. RAM members even identified themselves as part of the “Bandung world,” going so far as to hold a conference in November 1964 in Nashville called “The Black Revolution’s Relationship to the Bandung World.” In a 1965 article published in RAM’s journal Black America, members started to develop a theory of “Bandung Humanism” or “Revolutionary Black Internationalism,” which argued that the battle between Western imperialism and the Third World – more than the battle between labor and capital – represented the most fundamental contradiction in our time. They linked the African-American freedom struggle with what was happening in China, Zanzibar, Cuba, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Algeria, and they characterized their work as part of Mao’s international strategy of encircling Western capitalist countries and challenging imperialism. After 1966, the term “Bandung Humanism” was dropped entirely and replaced with “Black Internationalism.”

Precisely what “Black Internationalism” meant was laid out in an incredibly bold thirty-six-page pamphlet published by RAM in 1966, titled The World Black Revolution. Loosely patterned on the Communist Manifesto, the pamphlet identified strongly with China against both the capitalist West and the Soviet empire. The “emergence of Revolutionary China began to polarize caste and class contradictions within the world, in both the bourgeoisie [sic] imperialist camp and also in the European bourgeois communist-socialist camp. In other words, China was the wedge that sharpened contradictions between colonial peoples and the West. Rejecting the idea that socialist revolution will arise in the developed countries of the West, RAM insisted that the only true revolutionary solution is the “dictatorship of the world by the Black Underclass through World Black Revolution.” Of course, the authors were not working from today’s definitions; RAM used “underclass” to encompass all peoples of color in Asia, Latin American, Africa, and elsewhere; the “Black Underclass” was merely a synonym for the colonial world. China was in a bitter fight to defend its own freedom. Now the rest of the “black” world must follow suit: The Black Underclass has only one alternative to free itself of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and neo-colonialism; that is to completely destroy Western (bourgeois) civilization (the cities of the world) through a World Black Revolution and establishing a Revolutionary World Black Dictatorship can bring about the end of exploitation of man by mankind and the new revolutionary world be created. To coordinate this revolution, RAM called for the creation of a Black International and the creation of a “People’s Liberation Army on a world scale.” For all of its strident nationalism, The World Black Revolution concludes that black nationalism “is really internationalism.” Only by demolishing white nationalism/white power can liberation be achieved for everyone. Not only will national boundaries be eliminated with the “dictatorship” of the Black Underclass,” but “the need for nationalism in its aggressive form will be eliminated.” This is a pretty remarkable statement given RAM’s social and ideological roots. But rather than representing a unified position, the statement reflects various tensions that persisted through RAM’s history. On one side were nationalists who felt that revolutionaries should fight for the black nation first and build socialism separate from the rest of the United States. On the other side were socialists like James and Grace Boggs who wanted to know who would rule the “white” nation and what such a presence would mean for black freedom. They also rejected efforts to resurrect the “Black Nation” thesis—the old Communist line that in black-majority countries of the South (the “black belt”) have a right to secede from the union. The Boggses contended that the real source of power lies in the cities, not the rural black belt. In January 1965, James Boggs resigned from his post as Ideological Chairman.

### Case

#### Making the ballot mediate whether or not you are alive is violent---turns their impacts

Karlberg 3 (Michael, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE & CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left\*\* under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facng us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

#### The obsession with radical freedom understood by the 1AC as “agency” is rooted in a violent metaphysics that ignores our fundamental interconnectedness with others---the aff is the flipside of Darwinism, ensuring mass violence

Carkner 11 (Gordon E., B.Sc. in Human Physiology from Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario; a Masters of Divinity (theological studies) from Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in Deerfield, Illinois; and a PhD in philosophical theology from University of Wales 2006, Christian Campus Pastor at UBC, Vancouver with Outreach Canada, “Individualism and Radical Freedom Examine,” https://en.outreach.ca/Article/DNNArticleView/tabid/2265/ArticleId/4791/Individualism-and-Radical-Freedom-Examined.aspx) PM

There is a seductive attraction in the current language of radical freedom; it is a peculiarly late modern Western hermeneutic of emancipation and the details are important. It is often appealed to with respect to the discourse of democracy and empowerment. This passion for freedom is emerging in non-Western parts of the world as well, for instance in the historic protests across North Africa and the Middle East in the early 2011, the so-called*Arab Spring*. Dictators are called to step down and make room for freedom; power and wealth must be shared; governments have to be more accountable to the people. Freedom and individual rights runs deep with us and has much to do with our identity. Intellectual Christoph Schwöbel (1995, pp. 57-81) suggests that it is a concept that takes up a central position for self-understanding. He detects even a *hyper-inflation* in the rhetoric of freedom. Influential mid-twentieth century French intellectual Michel Foucault, on whose later work I wrote my PhD dissertation, saw freedom not as something *given or rights based*, but rather something that has to be struggled for, wrested from opponents, tyrants or from societal institutions or governments. Freedom, in a Foucauldian language, is an ontological ground of ethics; freedom becomes the starting point, the norm and framework, the very goal of ethics, its *alpha* and *omega*. Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, with whom I place Foucault in critical dialogue, offers a critique of this radical notion of freedom; the two premier philosophers make excellent interlocutors. We are examining in this essay the mythos of Radical Individualism, a powerful ideology that is embedded in radicalized views of freedom; it dominates Western consciousness in both early and late modernity. We demand the right to explore our own values, meet our own needs and to fulfill our own desires, to self-determine, construct self, to be master controller of our own destiny. Author Ayn Rand (Capitalist heroine to the Students for Objectivism) typifies the sentiment in her book *The Virtue of Selfishness*. Man must choose his actions, values and goals by the standard of that which is proper to man in order to achieve, maintain, fulfill and enjoy the ultimate value, that end in itself, which is his own life. (A. Rand, 1964, p. 25) The *male* emphasis is significant. The ultimate ethical rule of individualism is that individuals should be free to maximize their individual potential in order to pursue whatever they find most rewarding (details not included). Its mantra is: *I am who I am; I will become who I choose to become; no one else will choose for me; I interpret myself, speak for myself and justify my behaviour.* Note that this use of freedom as *self-determination* also entails a process of self-legislation and self-justification. One often hears the high-sounding proviso that my freedom should know no bounds except to avoid interference with the values or freedom of others. The kind of individualism we are discussing calculates in principle as an infinite, unlimited freedom for *homo autonomous.* Nothing should be forbidden according to a famous French mantra. Where do we locate it culturally? It must be grounded in how we see ourselves and how we live? Some of our cultural icons—the lone cowboy, the marginalized detective, the western frontier pioneer in Canada and America, the avant-garde artist or self-inventing Hollywood or music star—exemplify well this myth in North America. But no one is held in such jaded awe as the self-sufficient Wall Sreet entrepreneur, where elite money and power make an intoxicating mix in radical individualism. This person is tough, competitive and strongly self-assertive. In a gleaming Porche, this*transcendent being* resides in the tallest tower with the corner office and a fantastic view of the corporate universe, sometimes with his own elevator or private jet, drawing excessive bonuses, owning several expensive houses and living above most people’s reality. In the post-2008 recession movie “*Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps*”, Gordon Geko captures the image of this edgy financial gamer, a utilitarian willing to manipulate even his own daughter, who argues that “greed is still good”; this vice is now a *virtue* among successful players. The movies “*Enron: the Smartest Guys in the Room*” and “*Inside Job”* documents the excessive lifestyles and risky behaviour, and frankly greed addiction of top CEOs, bankers and financiers round the world, which lead to near collapse of the entire international financial system in 2008. Just how close we were is frightening; we peered long and hard into the abyss. Financial leaders fought hard for this unfettered freedom from government regulation; corporate lobbyists have gained a massive influence on government, shackling their ability to regulate. The book, *Contagion: the financial epidemic that is sweeping the global economy* by John R. Talbott,[1] reveals the depths of the corruption at all levels due to relaxed government restrictions on corporate behaviour, leading to poor governance and poor corporate and public accountability. Society and Main Street have paid a terrible price for the freedom, high risk behaviour and hubris of these élites. We should not forget that university life, and especially graduate school, often provides the crucible for these values of self-assertion and hubris. Graduate school is clearly a chosen route to self-development and better career opportunity, but students tend to develop over time an isolated self; they are taught to watch out for number one, signaled that, “It is up to you; carve out your niche.” Pressure to develop that all-important attractive job resumé can be intense, but no doubt a high priority in an increasingly complex, globalized world and competitive job market. Tragically, too often the pursuit of high marks and future career opportunities means that students succumb to cheating and plagiarism of entire papers in order to make the grade; there are some shocking statistics about how many participate; ethics is marginalized in the quest for status and monetary success. Some of our societal corruption clearly begins during postsecondary education. It is a time when parents and traditional authority figures are held at a distance, sometimes deconstructed and called into question; many students feel the competition and resonate with the philosophy of rugged individualism. New and more individualistic and power-oriented values shape students for the *real world*. They feel that they must transcend the masses in order to succeed. PhD students seeking to carve out their academic niche, and pursue a tenure track teaching position have to work extremely hard to build their credibility and publication record; stakes are high for high achievers. The challenge to be brilliant and to push out the frontiers of knowledge is both creative and deeply stressful; many are extremely tired by the end of this terminal degree and yet are expected to hit the ground running in the job world. Historically and intellectually, radical individualism and self-determining freedom is a product of modernity that has come to dominate Western thought since the 18th century known as the Enlightenment (early modernity). One thinks of Rene Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum* (I think; therefore I am), a summons to the individual to a *will-to-power* posture. The autonomous individual is released from the moral strictures of religion, past history and tradition (social parenting). The key values are self-reliance, freedom of choice, entailed by a weak sense of obligation to others (except for mutually agreed self-interest). Conquest, command and control are the goals of this self. In late modernity, as represented by Michel Foucault, aesthetics comes into play, personal feelings and individual choice are a top priority as one stylizes one’s life; radical individualism is intensified in late modernity. The only obligation is to make oneself in accordance with one's own ambition, or as Foucault might say to “invent oneself as a work of art”. This sort of self-constructed freedom implies that one’s very moral character has become a subject of one’s own creative self-interpretation. Christoph Schwöbel (1995, pp. 58-60) notes that culture in the West has moved through three conceptual stages of freedom: (a) the quest for release from coercion, often referred to as liberation from oppression, (b) the quest for release from internal or cultural blockages to free expression (breaking out of stereotypes or identities that bind—also strong in Foucault’s thought), but most significantly to (c) self-constitutive freedom as an ideal of self-definition and self-interpretation, the *radical* sense of freedom, which emerges in Foucault’s attempt to recover self and subjectivity in his late *oeuvre*. Freedom, in this sense, takes up the central controlling position in self-understanding and ethics. Self-mastery and self-love are critical to this third move. Foucault is an exemplary of the identity of the self in late modernity. Freedom shapes the fundamental principle of understanding what it means to be human (Schwöbel, 1995, pp. 57 & 60) and involves a re-enchantment with self, composing an identity which pulls back inside the bunker of self for protection from the manipulators (governmentality). In deciding for policies of action which incorporate choices concerning the interpretation of our possibilities of action, of our goals of action and of the norms of action we attempt to observe, we decide the fundamental orientation of our lives. Such decisions are examples of self-determination. Self-determination is contrasted to determination by external authorities. (Schwöbel, 1995, pp. 62-3) One’s very identity is shaped by rebellion against authority. We find the philosophical godparents of this type of individualism among German philosopher Friedriche Nietzsche, psychologist Sigmund Freud, political theorists John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, and economist Adam Smith. John Rawls is a current well-known political theorist who holds this view: the individual comes first and self-interest is assumed. Locke in England and Rousseau in France promote the idea that the individual is prior to society; social and political relations are a *social contract*, an agreement by mutual consent of individuals. Nietzsche gave legitimacy to the morally autonomous individual who buys into the *transvaluation of all values* (a call to reinvent morality and release it from normative structures), the rebel who defies society’s norms, and deconstructs past, especially Christian, moral fabric. Freud focused attention on the individual self and its neuroses and the desire to be happy or fulfilled, replacing the soul with the conflicted self as a key human concern. Adam Smith, the father of Capitalism, encouraged the strong pursuit of self-interest in business and economics, believing this would unleash untold creativity and wealth for all. Hobbes is a major influence in the encouragement of contentiousness (*agonisme*) and selfishness, the death of virtue and the sense that life is in essence a battle of *all against all*. All of these intellectuals are myth-makers of radical individualism. One can also detect the influence of Charles Darwin's survival of the fittest as it is transmuted into socio-biology of certain aggressive capitalist economic theories (with little concern for the poor, the weak, the *unfit*). New Age philosophy adds a religious justification to the idea of self-stylization, self-justification and narcissism (*a conversion to self*to use Foucault’s language) of self-interest. Of course, this is a cursory overview but it offers some markers for how we moderns became the kind of animals that we are today, concerned so much about our own *self-flourishing* within our *immanent frame* (C. Taylor, 2007, pp. 540-93, *A Secular Age*, Chapter 15 “The Immanent Frame”). Taylor (1989) also gives an important and thorough overview of what has shaped us morally and given us identity in his tome *Sources of the Self*. Radical Individualism holds a strong allure at first blush, especially for the young, strong and bright, or people who want to reinvent themselves, or make a name for themselves in a new business or Hollywood. Why would we want to question it? We need these imaginative, entrepreneurial people to innovate and create jobs and wealth, to pave the way forward. Everyone is trying to maximize her freedom and autonomy, *n’est-ce pa*? Is this not part of growing up and maturing, taking charge of one’s life? There is also, however, much to give us pause and draw us into critical thinking about our rugged individual identity; individualism includes a dangerous mythology at its heart; taken to an extreme, it can reap destruction for individual persons, families, institutions and society. Something human, especially the values and virtues of the communal, is definitely put at high risk in this pursuit; it can lead to social failure and personal loss, cynicism and even despair. As a way of life it constitutes an abstraction that hollows out the self, emptying life of some of its balance and richness. One’s identity can actually become quite brittle and fragile in this attempt to escape accountability and soar with the eagles. There can be a serious form of escape amidst the brilliance and a move towards a soulless existence. Many perspicacious thinkers would argue that we in fact need liberation from this myth of radical individualism and self-determined freedom or to besaved from freedom as an end in itself, or a release from all moral obligation. At the very least, freedom needs to be seen in context, and be examined for its content, lest it become a dangerous and destructive *mythos—*a weapon of mass destruction. Charles Taylor is one of those key intellectuals who offers a deep examination of our liberal heritage (*Hegel and Modern Society, 1979)*); he shows how the same language of freedom has been used to promote terror in France and Russia and anarchy (see the anarchy of Vancouver on June 15 after the final NHL game of 2011) and to give the political prisoner release. Healthy independence and individuation is one thing, but it is often assumed that if we are only more free to self-determine, we will be totally our fullest selves, *fulfilled*, *happy* and *good*. Taylor draws us up short and interrogates this culture re: how our idea of freedom is related to the good, and to truth and the transcendent Other. I spend much time on this in my thesis. But much of the vigorous pursuit of individual freedom and self-control has led, not to the strengthening of the self and improving the good of society, but rather to insecurity, poverty, social fragmentation, despair or self loss. Charles Taylor points out that Foucault’s controversial attempt to offer an aesthetic-freedom creates an open field in relationship to the Other and therefore the possibility of justifying cruelty and well as benevolence. He sees the darker draw towards violence in the self-determined freedom (1991, pp. 65-68). One can see that this can create a crisis in moral normativity, as it disallows nothing and dangerously heroizes the self and its creative self-expresson, a heady wine that can lead to hubris and narcissism. Accountability and healthy interdependence of persons is clearly missing; there resides a gap of taking responsibility for the Other and serious commitment to the common good. See Chapter Four, Part II, Section C. of my thesis on Aesthetics of Violence. The fascination with violence in the twentieth century has been a love affair with power ... even in milder forms neo-Nietzschean theories generate a sense of radical freedom ... this connects up in alliance with self-determining freedom ... The notion of self-determining freedom pushed to its limit, doesn’t recognize any boundaries, anything given that I *have* to respect in my exercise of self-determining choice. It can easily tip over into the most extreme forms of anthropocentrism. (Taylor 1991, pp. 67, 68)[2]

#### Communal care is reparative spiritualism that updates bourgeois ideology---navigating and adapting to hostile spaces is indistinguishable from logics of crisis management that displaces demand for transformation of material conditions

Tarrant 16 – Professor of English at Kingsborough Community College [Julie, “Mind over Matter and Other Posthumanist Feminist Tales,” in Cotter et al. eds. *All Too (Post)Human: The Humanities after Humanism*, Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 95-105]

These developments in production and the economy have meant that women globally have been increasingly drawn directly into the structures of capitalism and as such have been subject to uneven and combined development produced by class-divided social relations of production. Within these social relations a tiny minority of ruling class women have joined the ruling (capitalist) class and reap the benefits of control over the surplus labor of the vast majority of women who have been drawn, en masse, into the capitalist workforce, but under conditions where they are subject to deepening inequalities across the class divide as well as across the social fissures of gender, race, nationality, sexuality, age, and (dis)ability and the divisions of labor that underpin these ideological differences.

The "new materialist" feminisms are, broadly speaking, responses to real problems that have been produced by contemporary capitalism and its conflictual drive for profits in the context of the development of new forms of property (such as "hedge funds" and other financial capital)- forms of property which can make it appear that capital develops independently of the daily lives and struggles of workers and their labor- and a deepening social as well as economic crisis. However, through their re-conceptualization of what is material as "the forces, processes, capacities, and resiliencies with which bodies, organisms, and material objects act both independently and in response to discursive provocations and constraints," in other words, by positing the material as the autonomy of "matter" -and thus as a "supplement [to] cultural and discursive analysis of social and political phenomenon" rather than a re-thinking of the erasure of class and labor from cultural and social theory-these "new materialist" feminisms are ultimately part of the class struggles on behalf of capitalists which justify the current material (property) relations and aid the class-interested containment of collective struggles on the part of workers. 2 Contrary to their self-representations, "new materialist" feminisms are disenabling forms of spiritualism that displace explanatory critique of the emergent material conditions with strategies of enchanted affective adaptation and survival. These spiritualisms demonize, marginalize and suppress critique and, as such, work to dismantle materialist feminism's primary conceptual tool for social transformation in favor of an updated ruling-class ideology that prioritizes crisis-management over social transformation. To avoid merely reproducing sophisticated forms of the survivalism and "prepperism" that have emerged as individualistic coping responses to economic crisis and austerity, I argue that feminism needs to return to historical materialism in the tradition of Marx, Engels, and Kollontai to understand social life in terms of its root relations and aid in the struggles to bring about social transformation.

Exemplary of the "new materialist" feminism is Rosi Braidotti' s writing on "the politics of 'life itself,"' a theory which she organizes around the trope of "sustainability." Sustainability, a concept in ecology for living within natural limits, becomes in these writings a means of reconceiving the historical social relations of capitalism as if they were the unchangeable, underlying existential limit-situation of "life itself." The politics of "life itself" and the "new materialist" focus on seeking a sustainable feminism within this new, more "realist" approach to material reality, is a form of feminist theory and politics which is ultimately the already familiar theory and politics of reparative reading. Why is this significant? As Ellis Hanson suggests in a review of Sedgwick, "Faced with the depressing realization that people are fragile and the world hostile, a reparative reading focuses not on the exposure of political outrages that we already know but rather on the process of reconstructing a sustainable life in their wake." 3 In other words, reparative analysis begins not with critique of the so-called already known and presumably known to be unchangeable, but by focusing on how to live within the already-known-to-be hostile world. Such a theory of the social begins and ends by reducing knowledge to a matter of how to cope, how to feel, how to exist, etc. within what is taken to be unchangeable. The effect of this, focus on "sustainability" within hostility is that social transformation-, which requires the production of knowledge of what needs to be transformed-is treated as impossible. Abandoning the project of transformation, I argue, is a sign of the way dominant "materialist" feminism under the guise of "new materialism" - has increasingly abandoned the project of women's emancipation from exploitation, and, in the interests of capital, instead translates austerity measures into a theoretical discourse of getting by on less.

At the core of Braidotti' s theory of "sustainable feminism" and "life politics" is a "new materialist" understanding of "life." For Braidotti, life is made up of two parts-zoe and bias. Zoe, "life as absolute vitality," is the spiritual and bios is the "bio-organic" body which sets limits on the spiritual life force. 4 Braidotti writes, "Zoe, or life as absolute vitality, however, is not above negativity, and it can hurt. It is always too much for the specific slab of enfleshed existence that single subjects actualize. It is a constant challenge for us to rise to the occasion, to catch the wave of life's intensities and ride it." 5 Thus for Braidotti, the source of social contradictions is the conflict between zoe, that is, absolute vitality or spiritual life force, and our bio-organic bodies. As a result, Braidotti' s new materialism bypasses the ensemble of social relations and historical conditions that produce social contradictions in capitalism and presents contradictions as transhistorical and existential conditions of life as such. On this logic, our absolute vitality comes into the world and reaches the limit of the body and this causes us "pain." According to this narrative, however, there is no real way to compensate for pain. This explanation of pain is an example of bypassing the social. As such it is an accommodationist block to changing the conditions that produce suffering.

Thus, according to the underlying mysticism of "new materialism," when political-economic refugees from the Middle East and northern Africa drown, suffocate, or otherwise perish in attempts to cross into Europe, it would seem that their spiritual life force, which drove them to seek a better life for themselves and their families, came up against the limits of their bio-organic bodies and this is just one of the innumerable examples of the inevitable "pain" experienced by individuals who come up against such a conflict between zoe and bias. Moreover, on this view, citizens of Europe, the United States, and beyond are encouraged to view their own "pain" upon witnessing and learning about these deaths as a matter of an "intensity" that they should "ride" (feel) as much as possible in order to enable themselves to "deal with" this tragic situation and help to create "sustainable" change, which implies reforms to immigration policy. What this approach does not address or enable, however, is why and how to understand the class relations that have produced such "migrants" and why and how these class relations also shape the ideological conditions that produce people as completely expendable surplus labor or as, in essence, trash to be disposed of as efficiently as possible with the least disruption and cost as possible. This is the way in which "reparative reading" does the necessary ideological work for capital: it focuses on emotional response to the effects of exploitation but obscures underlying causes in the structural relations of capitalism, or the need to change them, and teaches workers how to adjust to and work within the conditions of their own exploitation.

#### Those who fail to meet their model of Black Livingness are excluded from a new standard of “recognizable ethnicity”--- turns case

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Part of what I am talking about here is what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego (2007) refers to as “coercive mimeticism,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act, believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough, as Asian-enough, and so forth. It is mimetic insofar as one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image, reproducing a very particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. These object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. At the same time, racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. Conversely, what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror, when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and define racialized bodies, evoking the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of the child’s body prior to Lacan’s (2005a, b) mirror stage. The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown – falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom. To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression. This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities. To be clear, I am not denying the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). It is important for us to have that conversation, and point out how notions of mestizaje, of hybridity in the Latino experience, may mask underlying tensions around race and skin color, and render the relative privilege of light-skinned Latinos such as myself invisible. At the same time, I am proposing that we also have a conversation that is perpendicular to a critique of racism and colorism, intersecting with it but going towards a different vector. How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino, Asian, Black, etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. Similarly, as Baratunde Thurston (2011) points out in his recent book, How to be Black, often this kind of black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino, or Asian, etc.). Reflecting on his own sense of his Blackness, he writes, “One of the most consistent themes in my own experience… is this notion of discovering your own Blackness by embracing the new, the different, the uncommon, and, simply, yourself” (p. 218). Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. As I argue, these perpendicular conversations push and pull toward different trajectories, but have as their intersection the most crucial nexus of political, cultural, and social justice. So what am I, in the end? I am whatever you want me to be: oppressor, oppressed, cracker, spic, enemy, friend, White, Black, lover, fighter, masculine, effeminate, strong, weak, dead or alive. Just know that with each turn, each attempt to define me, to mark me, to confine and bind me, you free me. Like the hysteric who produces ever shifting configurations of symptoms in order to throw the obsessive physician off guard (see Gherovici, 2003), I will keep producing knowledge of something else, something other, something that is incalculable and undefinable. Something Real. For you I’ll become a Hispanic hysteric, screeching Foucault (1972) with each symptom, with each episode of acting out, “Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (p. 17). Because in the end this is not really about me, or where I stand on the color line. It is about your illusion about where you stand and where you place yourself in the coordinates of race and ethnicity, of self and other, of Black and White. In that sense I function as your blank screen, receiving your projections and identifications, hopefully returning them to you as knowledge productions that question, destabilize, and decenter your ego, paving the way for the subject that slides in the link between signifier and signified, that does not know if it is caused by the signifier or the signified of race, but is instead, its own cause.

#### Antitrust law undergirds the structure of the social and political order

Becky Chao 18. Policy analyst at New America's Open Technology Institute, 1/11/18. “Why Millennials Should Care about Antitrust.” https://www.newamerica.org/millennials/dm/why-millennials-should-care-about-antitrust/

As the largest generation in today’s labor force and earners of disproportionately low wages, millennials have a key stake in the policy arena surrounding antitrust and competition policy. Though antitrust law may seem niche or abstract, it is part of the larger body of law that plays an active role in structuring society’s social and political order through the construction of wealth, power, and race. Jobs, occupational licenses, and intellectual property are all concepts mediated by law, which protects and upholds private interests, drawing boundaries and enforcing existing regimes of power. Law and legal institutions have at times created and maintained racialized wealth disparities, perpetuating racial privilege by regulating access to voting, transportation, education, and employment.

Similarly, the effects of antitrust law can be seen in the conditions it sets up around millennials’ lives. Antitrust law aims to promote fair competition. Fair competition means ensuring that small business owners have a fair chance at succeeding in their business ventures, which matters because older millennials are over 50 percent more likely to start their own business. Fair competition means preventing firms from rolling out unjustified higher prices to consumers, which matters because this enables millennials to stretch their disproportionately low salaries further and potentially begin accumulating wealth. Fair competition means preventing employers from colluding in the job market to yield higher wages and better benefits, which matters because non-compete agreements more likely hinder junior employees—more likely to be millennials—than senior ones.

Renata Hesse in her former role as Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division said it best: “In general, competition is fair because it distributes these rewards broadly to participants in the economy. But when companies harm competition – choking off competition or agreeing with rivals not to compete – they infect the economy with unfairness by accumulating power that the few can wield at the expense of the broader American public.” She deemed the goal of antitrust law to promote “economic fairness,” a term that more vigorously invokes egalitarianism ideals than “fair competition” does—a reframing that satiates populist demands while still emphasizing outcomes that antitrust and competition policy already work toward.

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There is a prevalent stereotype that millennials are entitled, narcissistic, and lazy, reinforced by the aforementioned statistics. But by unpacking this stereotype and examining the context in which millennials struggle to find employment and make a living, we may begin to realize the ways in which constraints on opportunities imposed by firms that abuse market power significantly deter millennials. In the midst of heightened popular interest and the circulation of numerous policy proposals in antitrust, we as a society are at a critical juncture in contemplating how we would like to structure policies—both inside and outside the realm of antitrust—that have tangible implications on everyday lives. Millennials, too, have a stake in this policy debate.

#### Antitrust law matters for every aspect of our lives, and debating the political details is essential to making it work

Bryce Covert 20. Contributor at The Nation and a contributing op-ed writer at The New York Times, 11/30/20. “The Visible Hand.” https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/david-dayen-monopolized-review/

In the morning, I shower right after I wake up. I choose from a number of products to clean myself, yet they are made by just two companies: Unilever and Johnson & Johnson. I brush my teeth with a toothbrush and toothpaste made by Procter & Gamble but sold under the separate brands Oral-B and Crest. Before I eat breakfast, because I have Type 1 diabetes, I take insulin, a drug that, because of pharmaceutical consolidation and anticompetitive patent hoarding allowed to run amok, cost about $20 for a vial in 1996 but now costs $275. Lunch isn’t any better. The peanut butter for my sandwich almost certainly comes from one of three companies; same with the jelly. We all have “choices,” but do we really get to choose?

Once you put on your “monopoly decoder ring,” David Dayen writes in his new book Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power, you start to see how this power influences every part of our lives. There’s a baby formula monopoly: Three companies—Abbott Laboratories (which makes Similac), Reckitt Benckiser (which makes Enfamil), and Nestlé—control about 95 percent of the US market. It even follows us after our deaths: Service Corporation International keeps buying up funeral homes and now earns more than $1 out of every $5 in profit from funeral services, and two companies, Hillenbrand and Matthews, make 82 percent of the country’s coffins and caskets.

Some monopolies have become so obvious that everyone can spot them. If you want to fly anywhere in the United States, you basically have four choices, all of which offer increasingly bad service. If you want cable and Internet, you usually have only one or two high-cost options and no power to fight back when the company tells you a technician will be coming anywhere between 8 am and 8 pm to set it up. If you want to search for information or buy something on the Internet, there’s one choice for each that dominates all the rest: Google and Amazon.

But monopolies crop up in all sorts of unexpected places. Match Group, the parent company that owns Match.com, also owns OkCupid, Tinder, and Hinge. Berkshire Hathaway, the holding company empire of billionaire Warren Buffett, owns brands as diverse as Duracell, Dairy Queen, Benjamin Moore, and Fruit of the Loom. The coffee brands Caribou, Peet’s, Intelligentsia, and Stumptown are all owned or partly controlled by the European firm JAB.

Our country is saturated with monopolies, but some might ask, does it matter? As Dayen shows, monopolies make it harder for workers to wield power when there are fewer and fewer employers to choose from. They make the economy less dynamic and innovative. They make society less equal, and by amassing so many resources, they are able to amass power to protect those resources. Monopolies are even a threat to our very democracy, drowning out the voices of the people.

Worries about monopolies date as far back as AD 483. At the beginning of his book, Dayen quotes Emperor Zeno decreeing, “No one may presume to exercise a monopoly of any kind.” Going as far back as the railroad barons of the 19th century, Americans have worried about the ill effects of economic consolidation. Theodore Roosevelt famously took them on as a populist trustbuster. The Granger farmers’ movement and Progressive era activists fought monopolies.

Dayen mentions much of this history, but his aim is not simply to recount it or engage in the contemporary debates over the ways monopolies warp our economy and our society; instead, he wants to spark a modern movement through real, human stories. Corporate concentration and antitrust regulation can sound like dry issues. Dayen seeks to remind us of the very real consequences they have in our everyday lives.

The stories he tells can often be heartbreaking. There’s Travis Bornstein, whose son, Tyler Bornstein, died of a heroin overdose at 23 after getting hooked on opioids that were prescribed for his elbow surgery when he was 18. Rather than call an ambulance or take him to a hospital, the friend Tyler Bornstein was with when he overdosed dumped him in a vacant lot in Akron, Ohio, and fled. “You can’t prepare to lose a child,” Travis Bornstein tells Dayen. “I felt like I failed as a father.” But the Bornsteins were failed by the rampant cartelization and concentration in the pharmaceutical industry: Tyler Bornstein’s death is one of over 200,000 related to opioids since OxyContin, manufactured by one of the Big Pharma companies, was introduced in 1996.

OxyContin, Dayen insists, is just one stark example of the dangers in an industry in which, as he puts it, “monopolies at every stage of the supply chain placed their bottom lines ahead of the health of the recipients of those drugs.” For example, “If you have glaucoma, the reason liquid from your eye drops constantly rolls down your cheeks is that companies deliberately make the drop larger than the human eye can hold. Every milliliter that falls out of your eye represents a tiny profit, and it adds up.”

Dayen also introduces us to Chris Petersen, a third-generation hog farmer in Iowa whose farm has been so battered by agricultural monopolies that his daughter, who grew up aspiring to join the family business, had to find work at a hotel instead. After several generations of farmers, “I’m it,” he tells Dayen. “This is the dead end. You know, it’s sad.” It’s hard for Petersen to compete with concentrated animal feeding operations, which shove thousands of hogs into giant feedlots without sunlight and with scant room to move, whose cost cutting has sent hog prices plummeting. As Dayen notes, four hog firms control two-thirds of today’s market.

We also meet Kate Hanni, who, with her husband and two children, was stuck on a grounded American Airlines flight in 2006 for nine hours without food or water, watching mothers use barf bags for diapers and others puke into them as the smell of overflowing bathrooms wafted through the cabin. The airline refused to let passengers off because doing so would have cost it money through mandated refunds. One claustrophobic traveler even tried to flash SOS signs through the window with his cell phone.

One might wonder if this is an isolated incident. But the entire industry is dominated by just four major airlines, and as Dayen writes, “as long as passengers have nowhere else to go, there’s no incentive to fix a perpetually broken system,” one in which long flight delays are frequent and the service gets worse and worse.

In Dana Chisholm’s quest for an affordable rental house in Southern California, Dayen gives us a story of how monopolization in real estate is running rampant: Chisholm eventually rented from the private-equity-backed landlord Starwood Waypoint, one of several Wall Street real estate companies that have become huge players in the rental market. In 2017, Starwood Waypoint merged with Invitation Homes and is now the nation’s largest rental landlord. More than 240,000 US homes are now in the hands of investors, mostly private equity firms. Because they own so many properties, these companies can jack up rents and fees while slow-walking upkeep and repairs. For Chisholm, that meant appliances that didn’t work, no running water in the sink, and a building infested with rats and roaches. When she contacted the management company, she had to wait months for repairs before getting a Zillow alert for her own house: The management company had listed it for rent even though she had just paid up.

While the stories Dayen offers take place all across the country, from rural areas to Los Angeles’s urban sprawl, and involve people in very different communities and careers, they have the same nugget of truth at their heart: When companies are allowed to keep consolidating, people lose. Without robust regulation that keeps consolidation in check, corporations will keep laying waste to our economy and our lives.

Dayen wrote his book before the current health crisis but in many ways anticipated it. Concentrated supply chains are brittle and unable to cope with major disruptions, such as a pandemic that spikes demand for toilet paper and nose swabs alike. Meat-processing giants that squeeze out smaller players through aggressive line speeds and cost cutting are now major Covid-19 hot spots, thanks to a focus on the bottom line instead of higher safety standards and humane worker treatment. “Amazingly,” Dayen writes, “news deserts correlate with the spread of infectious diseases, as epidemiologists rely on local articles to track outbreaks.”

As Dayen convincingly shows, monopolies are so interwoven in our economy and our lives that there is no escape from them. But his book also highlights some of the challenges faced by a politics that is primarily focused on monopoly. If you see it everywhere without pausing to clarify what is anticompetitive behavior and what is just plain old greed, you risk having the concept lose its specific meaning.

Dayen points a finger at the tech monopolies Google and Facebook, for example, for ravaging the media industry by bleeding advertising dollars dry through their dominance of the market. But there are also other forces pummeling the industry: Wall Street ownership, fickle billionaire backers, and smaller publications’ struggle to find new sources of revenue. Meanwhile, the media industry itself is dotted with monopolies, such as News Corp, which owns The Wall Street Journal and the New York Post and dozens of other properties; TV conglomerates that control local news; and dominant talk radio brands. Later, in a chapter on private equity, we begin to see how the problem with its quest for acquisitions is not only that it shrinks competition but also that it shifts companies’ focus from the production and distribution of goods to the maximization of money for investors. Private equity has, for example, fed upon the retail sector and spit out discarded brands like Sears and Toys “R” Us. This parasitic relationship seems to be less about monopoly power than avarice and a lack of regulation. Certainly, private equity funds have bought up companies in a number of sectors, leading to consolidation. But that’s not what happened to these retailers: The hedge funds came in, loaded the companies with debt, got fat off the fees, and then let the companies fail.

Dayen says that his book’s ambition is not to rehash economic arguments made elsewhere but to turn those arguments into a movement. But a call to action has to be clearly defined. Likewise, as liberal and left politics in the past demonstrated, alongside anti-monopolist politics must be a program of strong social policies. Breaking up health insurance cartels, for example, will help lower costs, but it won’t ensure health care for all. Anti-monopolism must define its potential and its limits and be married to other policy interventions.

There is a compelling reason to focus on anti-monopolist politics, which has garnered bipartisan support over the years. In Tennessee, Republican and Democratic lawmakers alike have tried to get rid of state limitations on municipal broadband service that were imposed at the behest of telecom giants. “We’re aligned on this issue, because it’s not theoretical, it’s practical,” says Chattanooga Mayor Andy Berke, a Democrat. “I’m a small-c conservative,” Christopher Mitchell, a researcher at the Institute for Local Self Reliance, tells Dayen. “The idea of a family moving because they lack broadband is devastating.” Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib stood with Freedom Caucus leaders Jim Jordan and Mark Meadows in demanding that a military contract monopolist return over $16 million in excess funds that it was able to squeeze out of the government. But it is where bipartisan support ends—on matters of redistribution and universal programs—that the lines are drawn between those seeking economic justice for all and those seeking merely a less tilted field.

One reason anti-monopolism is so popular among a certain set is that the solutions to monopoly power are easy to find. In fact, we often don’t need anything new. “We know how to handle monopolies,” Dayen points out, citing existing laws that can protect us against antitrust abuses but that have been misinterpreted or watered down. To him, this should be at the center of any anti-monopolist movement: restoring these laws with their original power and using them to break up monopolies, block mergers that create future ones, and regulate any that remain as public utilities. That’s all “entirely possible under existing law,” he adds.

The institutions are also in place, and not just in the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (which are supposed to police monopolies and bust trusts). The Federal Communications Commission is supposed to ensure universal, high-speed Internet access under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Civil Aeronautics Board, created in 1938, used to keep airlines from getting concentrated while ensuring widespread access to travel.

But if this is all a matter of laws and regulatory bodies doing the jobs they were given, then why aren’t they? Here Dayen looks to the underlying politics of monopolization. “The mechanisms are clear,” he writes, but “getting the political class to enforce them is the stumbling block.”

#### Black feminist jurisprudence is accessible---retreat from legal institutions forecloses tangible benefits

Collins 9 – Patricia Hills Collins is a distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park. Accessed May 9,2019. (“Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment.” page 277-280 <https://uniteyouthdublin.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/black-feminist-though-by-patricia-hill-collins.pdf>)

Black churches and schools have aimed to prepare African-Americans for full participation in U.S. society when the laws were changed. African-American women have experienced considerable success not only in getting laws changed, but in stimulating government action to redress past wrongs. The Voting Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, and other important federal, state, and local legislation have outlawed discrimination by race, sex, national origin, age, or disability status. This changed legal climate granted African-American women some protection from the widespread discrimination that we faced in the past. At the same time, class-action lawsuits against discriminatory housing, educational, and employment policies have resulted in tangible benefits for many Black women

The structural domain of power encompasses how social institutions are organized to reproduce Black women’s subordination over time. One characteristic feature of this domain is its emphasis on large-scale, interlocking social institutions. An impressive array of U.S. social institutions lies at the heart of the structural domain of power. Historically, in the United States, the policies and procedures of the U.S. legal system, labor markets, schools, the housing industry, banking, insurance, the news media, and other social institutions as interdependent entities have worked to disadvantage African-American women. For example, Black women’s long-standing exclusion from the best jobs, schools, health care, and housing illustrates the broad array of social policies designed to exclude Black women from full citizenship rights. These interlocking social institutions have relied on multiple forms of segregation—by race, class, and gender—to produce these unjust results. For African American women, racial segregation has been paramount. Racial segregation rested on the “separate but equal” doctrine established under the 1896 ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of segregation of groups. This ruling paved the way for a rhetoric of color-blindness (Crenshaw 1997). Under the “separate but equal” doctrine, Blacks and Whites as groups could be segregated as long as the law was color-blind in affording each group equal treatment. Despite the supposed formal equality promised by “separate but equal,” subsequent treatment certainly was separate, but it was anything but equal. As a result, policies and procedures with housing, education, industry, government, the media, and other major social institutions have worked together to exclude Black women from exercising full citizenship rights. Whether this social exclusion has taken the form of relegating Black women to inner-city neighborhoods poorly served by social services, to poorly funded and racially segregated public schools, or to a narrow cluster of jobs in the labor market, the intent was to exclude. Within the structural domain of power, empowerment cannot accrue to individuals and groups without transforming U.S. social institutions that foster this exclusion. Because this domain is large-scale, systemwide, and has operated over a long period of time via interconnected social institutions, segregation of this magnitude cannot be changed overnight. Structural forms of injustice that permeate the entire society yield only grudgingly to change. Since they do so in part when confronted with wide-scale social movements, wars, and revolutions that threaten the social order overall, African-American women’s rights have not been gained solely by gradual reformism. A civil war preceded the abolition of slavery when all efforts to negotiate a settlement failed. Southern states routinely ignored the citizenship rights of Blacks, and even when confronted with the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision that outlawed racial segregation, many dug in their heels and refused to uphold the law. Massive demonstrations, media exposure, and federal troops all were deployed to implement this fundamental policy change. The reemergence of White supremacist organizations in the 1990s, many of which recirculate troubling racist ideologies of prior eras, speaks to the deep-seated resentment attached to Black women, among others, working toward a more just U.S. society. Events such as these indicate how deeply woven into the very fabric of American society ideas about Black women’s subordination appear to be. In the United States, visible social protest of this magnitude, while often required to bring about change, remains more the exception than the rule. For U.S. Black women, social change has more often been gradual and reformist, punctuated by episodes of systemwide upheaval. Trying to change the policies and procedures themselves, typically through social reforms, constitutes an important cluster of strategies within the structural domain. Because the U.S. context contains a commitment to reformist change by changing the laws, Black women have used the legal system in their struggles for structural transformation. African-American women have aimed to challenge the laws that legitimate racial segregation. As Chapter 9’s discussion of Black women’s activism suggests, African-American women have used various strategies to get laws changed. Grassroots organizations, forming national advocacy organizations, and event-specific social protest such as boycotts and sit-ins have all been used, yet changing the laws and the terms of their implementation have formed the focus of change. Even the development of parallel social institutions such as Black churches and schools have aimed to prepare African-Americans for full participation in U.S. society when the laws were changed. African-American women have experienced considerable success not only in getting laws changed, but in stimulating government action to redress past wrongs. The Voting Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, and other important federal, state, and local legislation have outlawed discrimination by race, sex, national origin, age, or disability status. This changed legal climate granted African-American women some protection from the widespread discrimination that we faced in the past. At the same time, class-action lawsuits against discriminatory housing, educational, and employment policies have resulted in tangible benefits for many Black women. While necessary, these legal victories may not be enough. Ironically, the same laws designed to protect African-American women from social exclusion have increasingly become used against Black women. In describing new models for equal treatment under the law, Black feminist legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw argues that the rhetoric of color-blindness was not unseated by the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling. Instead, the rhetoric of color-blindness was reformulated to refer to the equal treatment of individuals by not discriminating among them. Under this new rhetoric of color-blindness, equality meant treating all individuals the same, regardless of differences they brought with them due to the effects of past discrimination or even discrimination in other venues. “Having determined, then, that everyone was equal in the sense that everyone had a skin color,” observes Crenshaw, “symmetrical treatment was satisfied by a general rule that nobody’s skin color should be taken into account in governmental decision-making” (Crenshaw 1997, 284). Within this logic, the path to equality lies in ignoring race, gender, and other markers of historical discrimination that might account for any differences that individuals bring to schools and the workplace. As a new rule that maintains long-standing hierarchies of race, class, and gender while appearing to provide equal treatment, this rhetoric of color-blindness has had some noteworthy effects. For one, observes Black feminist legal scholar Patricia Williams (1995), it fosters a certain kind of race thinking among Whites: Because the legal system has now formally equalized individual access to housing, schooling, and jobs, any unequal group results, such as those that characterize gaps between Blacks and Whites, must somehow lie within the individuals themselves or their culture. When joined to its twin of gender neutrality, one claiming that no significant differences distinguish men from women, the rhetoric of color-blindness works to unseat one important strategy of Black women’s resistance within the structural domain. Black women who make claims of discrimination and who demand that policies and procedures may not be as fair as they seem can more easily be dismissed as complainers who want special, unearned favors. Moreover, within a rhetoric of color-blindness that defends the theme of no inherent differences among races, or of gender-neutrality that claims no differences among genders, it becomes difficult to talk of racial and gender differences that stem from discriminatory treatment. The assumption is that the U.S. matrix of domination now provides equal treatment because where it once overtly discriminated by race and gender, it now seemingly ignores them. Beliefs such as these thus allow Whites and men to support a host of punitive policies that reinscribe social heirarchies of race and gender. In her discussion of how racism now relies on encoded language Angela Davis identifies how this rhetoric of color-blindness can operate as a form of “camouflaged racism”: Because race is ostracized from some of the most impassioned political debates of this period, their racialized character becomes increasingly difficult to identify, especially by those who are unable—or do not want— to decipher the encoded language. This means that hidden racist arguments can be mobilized readily across racial boundaries and political alignments. Political positions once easily defined as conservative, liberal, and sometimes even radical therefore have a tendency to lose their dis tinctiveness in the face of the seductions of this camouflaged racism (Davis 1997, 264). Americans can talk of “street crime” and “welfare mothers,” all the while claiming that they are not discussing race at all. Despite the new challenges raised by the rhetoric of color-blindness and gender neutrality, it is important to remember that legal strategies have yielded and most probably will continue to produce victories for African-American women. Historically, much of Black women’s resistance to the policies and procedures of the structural domain of power occurred outside powerful social institutions. Currently, however, African-American women are more often included in these same social institutions that long excluded us. Increasing numbers of African-American women have gained access to higher education, now hold good jobs, and might be considered middle-class if not elite. These women often occupy positions of authority inside schools, corporations, and government agencies. Achieving these results required changing U.S. laws.

#### Infiltrating legalese key

Austin 89 – Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania (Regina, “Sapphire Bound!” page 548-549, 1989)

Looking at legal problems against the context of non-legal perspectives has its dangers. The legal scholar’s obligation to take the law seriously generally requires that her writing be legalistic-that she show the inadequacy of the existing rules, and either propose clever manipulations of the doctrine that overcome the weaknesses exposed by her critique or draft model legislation. This approach tends to collapse the inquiries into what black people need and want, and what they are likely to get, into one. The conservatism that is an inherent part of traditional doctrinal legal analysis can be a stifling handicap for the black female researcher. Speculation concerning proposals that are not rule-bound and lawyer-controlled (like, for example, strategies by which poor women might increase their power to shape the gynecological services provided by health care facilities ostensibly serving them) seems beyond the pale. That is utopian politics, not law or legal scholarship. Of course, black people get almost nowhere in terms of gain and enforcing legal entitlements without also exercising their political clout or scaring white people. (Truly powerless people do not “get” rights on account of their helplessness, and the rights they do “get” are protected only so long as they are backed up by the threat of disruption.) Thus, the black feminist legal scholar must be able to think political and talk legal if need be. Her pedagogical mission should extend to educating black women about the political significance of their ordinary lives and struggles. She must translate their frustrations and aspirations into a language that both reveals their liberatory potential and supports the legal legitimacy of their activism and their demands. The remedies we contemplate must go beyond intangibles. We must consider employing the law to create and sustain institutions and organizations that will belong to black women long after any movement has become quiescent and any agitation has died. Full utilization of the economic, political and social resources that black women represent cannot depend on the demand of the society insincerely committed to an ethic of integration and equal opportunity. Implementation of an agenda for black feminist legal scholarship and expanded study of the legal status of minority women in general will require the right sort of environmental conditions, such as receptive or at least tolerant non-minority publishers and a network of established academics engaged in similar pursuits. We minority female scholars must devote a bit of our sass to touting the importance of the perspective of minority women and the significance of their concerns to any list of acceptable law review topics. If anyone asks you to talk or write about anything related to your race or your sex, turn the opportunity into one for exploring the legal concerns of women of color. This essay, for example, grew out of an invitation I received to address a conference for women in law teaching on the subject of my experiences as a black female legal academic. The talk was listed under the general topic “Double Binds: Managing Your Several Roles” The term “double binds” evokes images of multiple restraints, redundant bondage, a no-win situation. It is not one that I as a black woman in American can lightly associate with myself. Our history is one of struggle and resistance, and the fight continues. “Bound,” however, has many meanings that better capture my actions, attitudes, and aspirations than “tied down”: to be attached to devoted to; to move by leaps; to be on the way; to be under a legal or moral obligation; and to secure within the covers of a book. I am not a Pollyanna and I am as pessimistic and cynical as can be. I simply refuse to be doubly or triply bound in the negative sense of the term by racist, sexist, and class-stratified society without its hearing from me.

#### Total isolation impossible---infiltration solves

Williams 70 [Robert F., civil rights leader, promoter of self defense, interviewed by The Black Scholar, “Interviews,” The Black Scholar Volume 1 Number 7]

Williams: It is erroneous to think that one can isolate oneself completely from institutions of a social and political system that exercises power over the environment in which he resides. Self-imposed and premature isolation, initiated by the oppressed against the organs of a tyrannical establishment, militates against revolutionary movements dedicated to radical change. It is a grave error for militant and just minded youth to reject struggle-serving opportunities to join the man's government services, police forces, peace corps and vital organs of the power structure. Militants should become acquainted with the methods of the oppressor. Meaningful change can be more thoroughly effectuated by militant pressure from within as well as without. We can obtain valuable know-how from the oppressor. Struggle is not all violence. Effective struggle requires tactics, plans, analysis and a highly sophisticated application of mental aptness. The forces of oppression and tyranny have perfected a highly articulate system of infiltration for undermining and frustrating the efforts of the oppressed in trying to upset the unjust status quo. To a great extent, the power structure keeps itself informed as to the revolutionary activity of freedom fighters. With the threat of extermination looming menacingly before black Americans, it is pressingly imperative that our people enter the vital organs of the establishment. Infiltrate the man's institutions.

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**Turns case – the political ontology of antiblackness is vouchsafed by a political economy of speculative risk and insurance logics that reduce black female flesh to fungible data---any link turns case – we don’t need to win slave is analogous to laborer, but erasure of economic frames like financialization foreclose challenges to logics of monetary accumulation that ensure gratuitous violence**

**Amaro, 18**  (Ramon Amaro, Lecturer in the Department of Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London; Research Fellow in Digital Culture at Het Nieuwe Instituut in Rotterdam; worked as Assistant Editor for the SAGE open access journal Big Data & Society; 2018, PhD, Philosophy, Centre for Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths; 2013, MA, Sociological Research, University of Essex; 1999, BSe, Mechanical Engineering, University of Michigan; “Machine Learning, Black Labour and Bio-epistemic Resistance,” presented as part of *After Work: Life, Labour and Automation*, a symposium exploring work and resistance through and against technology. Transcription from rvs, finders credit and cutting goes to tris)

Okay, hi. My name is Ramon Amaro. Thank you to the organizers for having me here today. I’m actually going to diverge a second and take the conversation to an ontological and theoretical point that can hopefully emerge to different conversations as we go on later. Namely, what I want to begin with is the idea of bare life of the black female body, an idea that Alessandra Raengo argues must be understood if we are even to critique modern forms of capital, as what we know as the black form is already subsumed in the monetary form of capital and the fictive substance of race. What I mean, and what I would like to propose here in following Raengo, is what she calls “**the ontological scandal**” perpetuated by slavery. This scandal, according to Raengo, **is repeated “with each instance of alienated black labor**, **each time blackness functions as the commodity form**, and with each repetition they continue to be reified.” But what’s important is **Raengo’s** gesture presupposes **that the production and subsequent** domination **of colonial** nations todayare predicated on the abstract reification of the black female body as a mode of currency. To even begin to address this ontological scandal, we must first think through how the black body is individuated as a currency of exchange within modern financial systems. For instance, extensive work has been done by **Spillers, Hartman, and others** to **illuminate the important role of** the cargo ship on **the Middle Passage as a scene of** capital **exchange and racial subjection**. However, **I want to build on this work to think through** the genesis of the black self as already informed by the logics of innumeration and speculative risk, where the pre-individuated state of black being is always already contaminated by the conditions of labor-based capital accumulation. But **this accumulation also informs a dissonance between the real black sense of self and any social agreement that may abstract the black self into**, as Denise DeSilva argues, a formative system of monetary value. In other words, as Ian BacComb describes, the growth of Anglo-European financial domination was not merely a cycle of labor and exchange, but a scaled transaction of quantifiable insurance risk associated with the contingency of death and illness aboard slave cargo ships. BacComb points to the British economy in particular to discuss the granting of a real existence of enslaved bodies inasmuch as the survival and the successful delivery of these bodies can be bought virtually as the hidden substance of insurance contracts and bills of credit. Or in the case of the British slave ship Zong, the enslaved body is underwritten as the speculative risk of capital, and public outrage. In this way, **the importance of the enslaved body to modes of capital is not predicated to actual material flesh, or even the potential for that body to labor, but was instead articulated as an abstract flow of enumeration and probability**. If, under this premise, we are to take W.B. DuBois at face value and consider the double consciousness of the racialized individual, then we are immediately confronted with the fragmentation of black genesis as a tension between what is made visible as blackness or black non-being, which Sylvia Wynters arguesis already owned by ontology as a problem of bio-epistemic compliance and the regime of prototypical capital existence, which I argue is symptomatic of a larger logic of social quantification. So I just wanna diverge for a second and return to the issue of the Zong for those who aren’t familiar, the issue of the slave body on the British slaver was the start and emergence of the British insurance industry. If anyone knows, there was an illness that broke out on the slave ship, in the middle of the Atlantic, seven crew members died, and I think it was in term of like twenty slaves, and the captain of that ship decided that, actually, it was cheaper to throw all the slaves overboard and claim the insurance than it was to continue the passage. And when he returned back to England, he sued the insurance company, and that was the start of litigation -- of the body itself as being a virtual point of risk. And what I’m arguing is that, since that development, obviously we know how pervasive the insurance industry is, how pervasive capital mechanisms are at identifying risk and probability, and what I’m arguing here is, following Raengo, is that what we know today as modern capitalism in the UK is already predicated on the violence of the black female body. So, to continue, as **the terms of contemporary capital depart from the derivation of value as the direct engagement with the** body **to the technics of labor practice**, so in other words, it no longer became about the actual slave being delivered to do manual labor – the financial gain was greater from actually deriving insurance risk on the body itself. **So** the body only became a black body once it was subsumed into capital types of risk. These engagements emerged as adaptive forms of information exchange that, unlike popular believe, are indifferent to the specificity of the body. However, it is specific only as much as the racialized body can be extracted into quantifiable forms of data and pre-emption**, which continues today to be defined as social value in contemporary techno-capital institutions.** What I’m attempting to highlight is that while the technology of shipping and insurance risk**,** predicated on violence and the abstraction of the black body, **were once the lens through which blackness was made visible, the emergence of new generative types of technology, like machine learning, enact an accelerated form of targeting and visibility that no longer require physicality, but depend on the meta-abstraction of all social phenomenon to locate the body as a measure of correlation and probability**. So, in other words, after the Zong, following Raengo here, after the Zong, the idea of abstracting the body into actual risk, of course, further objectified the black body, but it also set a precedent of actual citizenship being viewed as potential financial gain or potential investment.

#### And it turns communities of endurance – reduces Black Livingness into a commodity thru alienation – the 1AC will have a voice but lose its soul as it’s reincorporated as a new item on the market

Robinson 14 – Professor of sociology at UC Santa Barbara [William, *Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity*, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 222-4]

How viable are transformative strategies based on the notion that local communities can withdraw from global capitalism? The attempt to create alter- native communities at the local level, to set up cooperatives, to decentralize circuits of food supply, to withdraw from the global agro-industrial regime, to decentralize energy distribution and consumption, and to construct cooperative enterprises and local solidarity economies are necessary and important. Yet they do not in themselves resolve the problem of power. In the absence of a strategy to confront the state and to transform the system from within we are left with the dangerous illusion that the world can be changed without resolving this matter of power. Global capitalism is now internal to practically all communities on the planet. It has spun webs of worldwide interdependency that link us all to a larger totality. Global capitalism is indeed totalizing. The notion that one can escape from global capitalism not by defeating it but by creating alternative spaces or islands of utopia ignores the unpleasant fact that no matter how one wills it to be so, these spaces cannot disengage from capitalism, if for no other reason than that capital and the state will penetrate – often forcibly – and continuously reincorporate these spaces.

Localized solutions are too piecemeal to confront the power of global capitalism – to change the global balance of class and social forces. There is no way to get around the fact that the TCC holds class power over humanity, and the TNS exercises multiple forms of direct, coercive power. The state exercises power over us. This fact will not go away by ignoring this power. It is illusory to suppose that it can be countered by constructing autonomous communities, which in fact are not autonomous because such communities cannot extricate themselves from the webs of global capitalism, and even if they could, in theory, the state would not allow them to; it would use the force of its law to reincorporate such communities. There is no getting around confrontation with the state, no avoiding a struggle to wrest state power away from capital, its agents and allies. The struggle to withdraw from global capitalism, no matter how important, must be coupled with a struggle to overthrow global capitalism, to destroy the transnational capitalist state.

#### The critique of respectability politics is nothing but the mainstreaming of wokeness – propping them up as representatives of blackness armed with the power to decide who should be adored and who should be vilified in a post- post-racial symbolic economy conflates aesthetic idealization with political representation which intensifies capitalist consumption

Davis 19 (Elizabeth Davis is a PhD candidate in Social Justice Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto. Beside(s) Love and Hate: The Politics of Consuming Black Culture. Theory & Event. Volume 22, Number 3, July 2019. Project Muse//shree)

Blackness—used here in reference to black culture(s) and representations of black people without any claim to a notion of authenticity—is imagined in contemporary popular culture through a conflation of aesthetic and political representation. The renown awarded such films as Barry Jenkins's (2016) Moonlight and Jordan Peele's (2017) Get Out, marks an increase in the social and institutional recognition and approval of blackness, which is commonly hailed as a sign of racial "progress." Pop culture figures like Beyoncé and Kendrick Lamar are now often heralded as emblems of black power and progressive politics—politics that neatly coincide with their palatability, and hence, profitability. The most recent demonstration of the mainstream celebration of blackness manifested in the media hype surrounding Ryan Coogler's 2018 film Black Panther which spectacularly confirmed the profitability and salience of black power as motif. The practically unanimous embrace of the film was an instance of the culture industry clearly knowing its audience, but not all attempts to valorize blackness on the face of things have been so successful. The media fallout from the 2017 Kendall Jenner Pepsi commercial (Batchelor & Hooton 2017), which trivialized black protest while banking on its aesthetics, and the February 2018 Dodge Superbowl commercial (Bailey 2018) featuring a perverse voice-over by Martin Luther King Jr., both evidenced the attempted harnessing of black power as motif for advertising in moments of widespread recognition that corporate America had missed its interpellative mark. In intimation of a new cultural wave of (post-)post-racial fantasy, the malleability and mainstreaming of wokeness is increasingly evident, and no doubt we will continue to see its development in the years to come. White (popular) culture has largely moved on from the fears that marked the turn of the last century, when Eminem threatened to bring rap—conceived as a foreign and dangerous element—into the white suburban home. The logic now, at an increasingly mainstream level, suggests a cultural politics of wokeness is (sometimes clumsily) supplanting previous schematizations of racial feeling among the politico-cultural center/left. [End Page 577]

This increasing salience and recognition of blackness stands beside our increasing witness of mass-spectacularized racial violence through the video capturing of instances of white supremacist violence if not enacted by, then (at least de-facto) sanctioned by the state. There is a very real sense in which people relate to the presence of blackness on the main stage with feelings of hope and a sense of racial "progress." At the same time, there is also a very real sense in which the circulation of images of violence against black people (whether in 12 Years a Slave or in videos of police violence) function as the latest iteration of the longstanding tradition of white people sharing lynching photos and memorabilia.

The narrative framing of progress in representation purports to stabilize the relationship between representation in the aesthetic sense and in the political sense, but their relationship is indeterminable, or rather, it changes. The aesthetic codes of "diversity" and "multiculturalism" reflect and reproduce this narrative framing, using "inclusivity" to mask the difference in modes of visibility and presence. Challenging this aesthetic requires challenging logics of identity and representation (as if, for example, one whose identity is like mine will represent my interests or me). But stepping back from this progressive logic (itself a capitalist aestheticization of time), requires that we struggle against the feeling that progress could be an appropriate metric with which to understand changes in (gendered, racialized, sexualized) representations at all, and to wonder how we might understand the politics of representation apart from the tidal pull of progressive narrative framing.

As the recent reinvigoration of white supremacist extremism has increasingly polarized many Western political parties and populaces, cultural forms that celebrate blackness have provided moments where we can see taste operating as a cultural metric to determine who is racist and who is woke. But I resist the idea that cultural critique hinges on sorting out the good from the bad apples. Fanon cautioned against such a reading in Black Skin, White Masks while discussing racism in France:

Once and for all we affirm that a society is racist or is not. As long as this evidence has not been grasped, a great many problems will have been overlooked. To say, for instance, that northern France is more racist than the south, or that racism can be found in the subalterns but in no way involves the elite, or that France is the least racist country in the world, is characteristic of people incapable of thinking properly.

(Fanon 2008, 66)

Given this admonition, and this call to think of the social totality, alongside the revival (or perhaps continuity) of the "culture wars" context of politics in Anglo-America, this essay is less interested in discerning [End Page 578] what kind of cultural taste is racist or not, and more interested in figuring out how racism is operating alongside (post-)post-racial fantasy and the ideal of anti-racist progress envisioned in the increasingly mainstream celebration (or conspicuous consumption) of blackness.

Despite the fallacy of progress as a means of understanding the politics of aesthetics, there is undoubtedly a deep connection between black cultural representation and anti-racist social and political change. That connection is central to Sylvia Wynter's work. In her essay on this very topic, Katherine McKittrick argues that "making black culture reinvents black humanity and life" (McKittrick 2006, 85). Drawing on Wynter, she describes how the making of black culture was and is a rebellion against slavery and social death and as such, a reinvention of the dominant meaning of being human. Because for Wynter anti-blackness is neurobiologically ingrained (elaborated below), such a reinvention, McKittrick argues, must be embodied and felt in order to enact a new order of consciousness that breaks from the grip of anti-blackness. McKittrick explains how for Wynter, "creative narratives […] simultaneously narrate and disrupt normative conceptualizations of humanism" (80). McKittrick salvages a history of such narratives normally hidden within the dominant history of African enslavement, presenting one in which black rebellion was always part of the Middle Passage, the plantation, and its afterlife—one in which we can see how black aesthetic creation enacted "'the revolutionary demand for happiness' [and] demonstrates that creative acts mark the affirmation of black life" (81, citing Wynter).

While McKittrick focuses on the necessary and transformative, life- and world- renewing, political and ethical possibilities of black aesthetic production, my focus here is different: it queries the place and function of black aesthetics within economies of representation and their modes of consumption. McKittrick highlights Wynter's point that black culture was, and continues to be, considered "non-cultural," that is, "stigmatized because it resides outside of normative, respectable, cultural codes," and that those "nonpersons" who did make culture—thus threatening the logic of the plantation—were harshly punished (McKittrick 2006, 87). My focus is on the flip side of this, examining how black culture has been loved and consumed. Furthermore, black aesthetic production (black male jazz musicians) invented being "cool," and black culture continues to define the contours of that aesthetic which is so central to capitalist, consumer culture.

Protest movements and political expression in these woke/fascist times have been characterized by overtly emotional polarized narrations of the political, especially surrounding race, love, and hate. Racism and anti-racism are discursively constructed around the struggle of who gets to determine the proper objects of love and hate (Ahmed 2004, Ch. 2). This is telegraphed by protest discourse like [End Page 579] "Love Trumps Hate," and enshrined in legal discourse of hate crimes and hate speech. One conceptual result of framing racism as feelings of hate is that white supremacy and anti-racism are articulated in terms of who has the "right feelings." In this formulation, love and hate are overdetermined and constant. In protecting idealized conceptions of these emotions and their political orientations, we are left with little analytical space in which to understand the complexity of political feeling, namely, the contradictory love of black culture by a racist society.2 While love and hate frame the hegemonic discourse that structures how racism and anti-racism are socially apprehended, an analytic of consumption, or how taste is formed, tells us more about the racial structure of feeling in which we are implicated. To call this racial structure of feeling into question, requires, in Wynter's terms, "the calling into question of our present culture's purely biological definition of what it is to be, and therefore what it is like to be, human" (Wynter 1999, 31).3 I follow Wynter and McKittrick in the idea that re-imagining the human is an embodied project, for truly having a new conception of what it means to be human is not a matter of possessing new knowledge, as much as it is a matter of changing a structure of feeling.

#### Communicative Capitalism link – the cultural critique of respectability markets less fixed subjects that are flexible and less accountable to collectives

Khan 16 (Abraham – assistant professor who holds joint appointments in the department of communication and the department of Africana studies at the University of South Florida, A rant good for business: Communicative capitalism and the capture of anti-racist resistance. Popular Communication The International Journal of Media and Culture. V14 I1)

This claim, however, disregards its own influence over the conversation’s power law; the anti-racism generated by the hub **vastly** outweighed the racism discovered in it. In an important sense, this dynamic stems from an anxiety regarding essentialism at the heart of liberalism’s racial problematic. Despite what amounts to a refusal, **critiques of black respectability presuppose the broad appeal of their premises**. Liberal social movements throughout the 20th century are surely responsible for helping us understand Sherman in a context structured by difference. Eric Liu (2014) argued in The Atlantic that conversation about Sherman worked like a cultural mirror, **a “story that we tell over and over again**, as if working out conflicting memories of a highway accident or reading a kaleidoscopic Tim O’Brien short story about combat, to try to make sense of who we are and what’s happening to us in a time when tribe and identity are getting scrambled and realigned explosively.” The scrambling and realignment of tribe and identity are supposed to be the payoff of liberal social movements. We cannot take identity for granted. Nothing is as it seems. Dean (2009) seems to agree: “As a result of the critical work of these movements, as well as the accompanying decline of the welfare state and empowering of neoliberalism, racial, sexual, and ethnic identities are less fixed, less stable, less available as determinate subject positions” (p. 65). Dean points to the possibility that Harris’s formulation of the relation between neoliberalism and respectability politics may move in the **wrong** direction. Instead of saying that black respectability accommodates neoliberalism, it may be the case that **neoliberalism accommodates the critique of respectability.** Following Slavoj Zizek, Dean (2009) claims that whereas symbolic identities under the Keynesian welfare state “were mobilized politically in and as civil society” through instantiations of community as “sites from which we can see ourselves,” **under neoliberalism they became “fluid, hybrid, and mobile imaginary identities”** (p. 65). The movement from symbolic to imaginary identity entails a collapse of stability in the categories required to produce collective action. Imaginary identity is evanescent and radically mutable, aligned ideologically with capitalism in atomizing social life and in attaching market value to the transience of the self. In Sherman’s context, the anti-racist critique of black respectability obtains its warrant from imaginary identity. Instead of mobilizing reliable symbols of socioeconomic injustice, the critique of respectability turns Sherman over to capital, freeing him (and us) to express his blackness in any fashion that meets market demand. Essentialism is subverted, but race politics are left without an “ultimate guarantor of meaning, no recognized authority that stops our questioning or assuages our doubts” (Dean, 2009, p. 64). Tribe and identity may scramble but never realign, at least not for very long, and never in ways that generate enduring symbols around which collective resistance might be mounted. Imaginary identity thrives under a condition Mark Andrejevic (2007), also following Zizek, calls the decline of symbolic efficiency, a “generalized skepticism towards metanarratives” that claim to underpin the social order or organize collectivities and solidarities. To the extent that neoliberalism urges endless refashioning, **social subjects are inclined to disengage from collective sensibilities that put market participation at risk**. All identity is strategic performance, which not only demands exceptional creativity, but also alerts us to the refashionings of others. The consequence is widespread attention not to the substance or content of speech, but to its strategic function, a pervasive “mistrust of what is said in favor of what can be detected” (Andrejevic, 2007). Sherman provoked neoliberal impulses to peel back, look beneath, and decode both the myopia of his critics on Twitter and the profitable ingenuity of his rant. Moreover, **neoliberalism’s reliance on imaginary identities trades attention to capitalism’s social form for the fluidity of cultural expression as the arena of political struggle, opening anti-racism to co-optation.** Consider Kevin Beckford’s (2014) defense of Sherman in the Huffington Post. He writes, “Society has very specific boundaries for Black men and those boundaries are not supposed to be muddled. We are not supposed to be multidimensional. We are told that we are supposed to be static.” Things would be not be better if black people were unidimensional or static, but the positing of identity’s boundary—itself belied by the preponderance of anti-racist reckoning—reaches for the decline of symbolic efficiency as aresource, undermining “a firm place to stand, a position from which one can make sense of one’s world

#### New Link – structures determine distribution of violence, not interpersonal violence explain battle fatigue – care in locales enact change at the level of map rather than territory, they’re cruelly optimistic because they believe they can transcend hostile societies, but that can only happen thru concrete party platforms – energy doesn’t generate self love but is accumulated as currency

Davis 19 (Elizabeth Davis is a PhD candidate in Social Justice Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto. Beside(s) Love and Hate: The Politics of Consuming Black Culture. Theory & Event. Volume 22, Number 3, July 2019. Project Muse//shree)

For Wynter, this thinking beside(s) love and hate requires attending to the articulation of feelings with structures of feeling. She describes how the Black Power Movement, and other social movements of the 1960s and '70s, alongside the global anti-colonial movements, enacted a "psychic emancipation" by which subjugated peoples profoundly reimagined their conceptions of themselves (2006, 110). This shift marked a positive reaffirmation of identity exemplified in the slogan "Black is Beautiful." But it was a psychic emancipation, Wynter says, "effected at the level of the map, rather than at the level of the territory. That is, therefore, at the level of the systemic devalorization of blackness and correlated over-valorization of whiteness, which are themselves only proximate functions of the overall devalorization of the human species" (2006, 116). For Wynter, that these feelings effected a global psychic emancipation, does not mean they were the "right feelings." They were an insufficient challenge to the mode of sociogeny of the dominant global order.

To change the mode of sociogeny of a culture, to find the answer "on the objective as well as the subjective level" (Fanon 2008, xv) would take a stance beside(s) the affirmation that Black is Beautiful. A reimagination of the human that in Frank Wilderson's (2010) terms requires recognizing subjective capacity as itself built against blackness. For Wilderson, this imagining is a more difficult task today than in the 1960s and '70s: "though the semantic field on which subjectivity is imagined has expanded phenomenally through the protocols of multiculturalism and globalization theory, Blackness and an unflinching articulation of Redness are more unimaginable and illegible within this expanded semantic field than they were during the height of the FBI's repressive Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO)" (2010, 9). For Wilderson (in contrast to contemporary "feelings" of progress) blackness has become less legible, and to decipher the "grammar of [Black] suffering" that underwrites cinematic and political speech rests not on a question of love and hate but, drawing on Saidiya Hartman, of accumulation and fungibility.13

But if there are many different registers and orientations of feeling as it is lived in relation to structures of feeling, what would it be, how [End Page 590] would we know, at what level of feeling we are feeling? Or rather, how might we conceptualize subjective, intersubjective and collective feeling as articulated with the political—in particular historical moments, in social movements, and in the reproduction of the episteme? This unclarity about levels and modes of love, affirmation, and celebration of blackness, is one origin story of how both Jared Sexton and Fred Moten come to need to state that "Afro-pessimism is 'not but nothing other than' black optimism" (Moten 2013, 742; Sexton 2011, 37). Afro-pessimism is the insistence on thinking with and through the "subjectivity under erasure" (Wilderson 2010, xi) that is blackness, and black optimism is an orientation and opening up towards the possibilities of black life. They hold in tension that black social death and black social life do not negate each other (Sexton 2011, 28–29). If the misrecognition that would posit them as opposites marks a scene of dissensus, then it is not through the identity of black optimism and Afro-pessimism that an ethics is possible, but as Moten would have it, recognizing the difference between the two as infinitesimal: "…if Afro-pessimism is the study of [the impossibility of loving blackness], the thinking that I have to offer […] moves not in that impossibility's transcendence but rather in its exhaustion" (Moten 2013, 738).

Exhaustion, of the im/possibility of loving blackness, would take all of the steam out of the engines of progress that narratively frame representation—where consumption is conflated with both legibility and love. For who is to say that the white woman didn't love blackness who came up to Billie Holiday in an L.A. nightclub to request that she sing "Strange Fruit" by saying: "Why don't you sing that sexy song you're so famous for? You know, the one about the naked bodies swinging in the trees" (Davis 1998, 195). The point being not to validate such a love, but to be weary and wary of the terms of engagement by which "love" must be idealized and defended.

Economies of white enjoyment of black life have defined the brutal processes of racialization forged in the Middle Passage that shape who and how we are (Hartman 1997). In the "afterlife of slavery" (Hartman 2006), if we are to apprehend that term, we are obliged to study how these libidinal and affective economies are articulated with the formal economy. What neoliberal capitalist politico-economics has done best is to erode our capacity to imagine things differently. It feels like we have less with which to imagine ways of being together outside our current circuits of production, distribution, exchange, consumption. That Harriet Tubman is slated to be the new face of the US twenty-dollar bill calls me quite clearly to reject the prevailing notion that relations of consumption are good enough kinds of relations. [End Page 591]

#### Cap turns self-expression of identity thru psychic alienation – incorporates subjects into the rat race of self innovation regardless of their willingness – amplifies battle fatigue

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As we have seen, neoliberalism propagated its ideology through a division of labour – academics shaping education, think tanks influencing policy, and popularisers manipulating the media. The inculcation of neoliberalism involved a full-spectrum project of constructing a hegemonic worldview. A new common sense was built that came to co-opt and eventually dominate the terminology of ‘modernity’ and ‘freedom’ – terminology that fifty years ago would have had very different connotations. Today, it is nearly impossible to speak these words without immediately invoking the precepts of neoliberal capitalism.

We all know today that ‘modernisation’ translates into job cuts, the slashing of welfare and the privatisation of government services. To modernise, today, simply means to neoliberalise. The term ‘freedom’ has suffered a similar fate, reduced to individual freedom, freedom from the state, and the freedom to choose between consumer goods. Liberal ideas of individual freedom played an important role in the ideological struggle with the USSR, priming the population of the Western world to mobilise behind any ideology that purported to value individual freedoms. With its emphasis on individual freedoms, neoliberalism was able to co-opt elements of movements organised around ‘libertarianism, identity politics, [and] multiculturalism’.55 Likewise, by emphasising freedom from the state, neoliberalism was able to appeal to anarcho-capitalists and the movements of desire that exploded in May 1968.56 Lastly, with the idea of freedom being limited to a freedom of the market, the ideology could co-opt consumerist desires. At the level of production, neoliberal freedom could also recruit emerging desires among workers for flexible labour – desires that were soon turned against them.57 In struggling for and successfully seizing the ideological terrain of modernity and freedom, neoliberalism has managed to wind its way inexorably into our very self-conceptions. In arrogating the meaning of terms such as modernisation and freedom, neoliberalism has proved itself to be the single most successful hegemonic project of the last fifty years.

Neoliberalism has thus become ‘the form of our existence – the way in which we are led to conduct ourselves, to relate to others and to ourselves’.58 It is, in other words, not just politicians, business leaders, the media elite and academics who have been enrolled into this vision of the world, but also workers, students, migrants – and everyone else. In other words, neoliberalism creates subjects. Paradigmatically, we are constructed as competitive subjects – a role that encompasses and surpasses industrial capitalism’s productive subject. The imperatives of neoliberalism drive these subjects to constant self-improvement in every aspect of their lives. Perpetual education, the omnipresent requirement to be employable, and the constant need for self-reinvention are all of a piece with this neoliberal subjectivity.59 The competitive subject, moreover, straddles the divide between the public and the private. One’s personal life is as bound to competition as one’s work life. Under these conditions, it is no surprise that anxiety proliferates in contemporary societies. Indeed, an entire battery of psychopathologies has been exacerbated under neoliberalism: stress, anxiety, depression and attention deficit disorders are increasingly common psychological responses to the world around us.60 Crucially, the construction of everyday neoliberalism has also been a primary source of political passivity. Even if you do not buy into the ideology, its effects nevertheless force you into increasingly precarious situations and increasingly entrepreneurial inclinations. We need money to survive, so we market ourselves, do multiple jobs, stress and worry about how to pay rent, pinch pennies at the at the grocery store, and turn socialising into networking. Given these effects, political mobilisation becomes a dream that is perpetually postponed, driven away by the anxieties and pressures of everyday life.

At the same time, we should recognise that this production of subjectivity was not simply an external imposition. Hegemony, in all its forms, operates not as an illusion, but as something that builds on the very real desires of the population. Neoliberal hegemony has played upon ideas, yearnings and drives already existing within society, mobilising and promising to fulfill those that could be aligned with its basic agenda. The worship of individual freedom, the value ascribed to hard work, freedom from the rigid work week, individual expression through work, the belief in meritocracy, the bitterness felt at corrupt politicians, unions and bureaucracies – these beliefs and desires pre-exist neoliberalism and find expression in it.61 Bridging the left–right divide, many people today are simply angry at what they see as others taking advantage of the system. Hatred for the rich tax evader combines easily with disgust for the poor welfare cheat; anger at the oppressive employer becomes indistinguishable from anger at all politicians. This is linked with the spread of middle-class identities and aspirations – desires for home ownership, self-reliance and entrepreneurial spirit were fostered and extended into formerly working-class social spaces.62 Neoliberal ideology has a grounding in lived experience and does not exist simply as an academic puzzle.63 Neoliberalism has become parasitical on everyday experience, and any critical analysis that misses this is bound to misrecognise the deep roots of neoliberalism in today’s society. Over the course of decades, neoliberalism has therefore come to shape not only elite opinions and beliefs, but also the normative fabric of everyday life itself. The particular interests of neoliberals have become universalised, which is to say, hegemonic.64 Neoliberalism constitutes our collective common sense, making us its subjects whether we believe in it or not.65

#### Alt solves – party politics is collective care that transcends the self – the labor of struggle is a source of energy, rather than draining it

Loewe 12, B. an organizer and communicator, has served as NDLON's Communications Director, supported the Alto Arizona work against SB 1070 and Sheriff Arpaio, and participated in the organizing of the 2010 US Social Forum in Detroit [“An End to Self Care,” *Organizing Upgrade*, October 15 12, http://www.organizingupgrade.com/index.php/blogs/b-loewe/item/729-end-to-self-care]

As long as self-care is discussed as an individual responsibility and additional task, it will be something that middle-class people with leisure time will most easily relate to and will include barriers to the lives of people without time to spare. It becomes one more unchecked box on a to-do list to feel bad about, an unreal expectation, or a far-off dream.

The movement is my self-care not my reason for needing it.

Don Andres awoke every morning at 5:00am to arrive at a street corner to look for work by 6:00am. He’d work a full day of heavy construction and still arrive at the 7:00pm meeting. He’d routinely fall asleep but he was there. Why? Because organizing together to improve conditions, to create alternatives, to band together, was the only option for how care could be anything but alien in his life as a day laborer. Being at the meeting was self-care.

Lack of care is systemic. Therefore resistance to those systems is the highest affirmation of care for oneself and one’s community. Movement work is healing work.

What self-care often misses is the reality that for the majority of people engaged in social justice movements, participation is out of necessity. That a collective effort in the form of social movement is the highest articulation of caring for one’s own self in a world designed to deny your worthiness of care. Too many people discussing self-care overlook the structural barriers that make access to the care they are speaking of impossible without the struggle they often discuss as the cause of their need to ‘take care of themselves.’

Even for someone like myself who has the majority of my materials needs met, I feel most alive, most on fire, most able to go around the clock, when I’m doing political work that feels authentic, feels like it pushes the bounds of authority, and feels like it is directly connected to advancing my individual and our collective liberation.

The truth is that we cannot knit our way to revolution. The issue is not that movements are taxing, because truly they are. It’s called ‘struggle’ for a reason. But they go from strain to overtaxing when we seek to fulfill our political aspirations through vehicles never meant to carry them like in non-political formations or some 501c3s.

The crisis of care is also a crisis of organization. Non-profits are built to do a lot of good, but they have inherent limitations that mean they are rarely built to fulfill our visions of the transformative organizing that would usher in a world where we could feel whole. Most engaged in social movements today are originally driven out of either a concrete material necessity and/or a deep connection to the wrong that accompanies inequality and a drive to make it right. However the majority of organizations available to us today are designed for gentle reforms but not the fundamental transformation our spirits crave. As a result, we try to transform a model unfit to nourish our hearts and then treat that frustration with tonics and diets and stretches instead of placing our efforts in creating a collective space that unleashes our heart’s creative desires.

Maria Poblet of Causa Justa Just Cause once said, “Burnout is not about the amount of hours you work, it is about the amount of political clarity you have.” What that means is that there is no chance of us consistently burning the midnight oil if we don’t at our core believe what we’re working on will get us to a new day and no amount of yoga or therapy or comfort food we supplement our work with will compensate for that. However, if we can see a better world just over the horizon, like a marathon runner nearing a finish line, we can find endless wells to draw upon as we work to usher it in. I have literally gone from being in debilitating pain and only being able to accomplish three hours of work each day to working 18 hour shifts the same week in a completely different context. The difference was not the conditions of my work. It was my connection to my purpose.

The problem with self-care is that there is an underlying assumption that our labor is draining. The deeper question is how do we shape our struggles so that they are life-giving instead of energy-taking processes. When did activities that are aimed to move us closer to freedom stop moving us?

#### Solves the aff via nullification---market logics transform persons to things and legitimize dual logics of commodification and gratuitous punishment

Mallipeddi 16 – Assistant Professor of English at Hunter College [Ramesh, *Spectacular Suffering*, University of Virginia Press, pp. 3-4]

I begin with a juxtaposition of Dickson and Equiano because they encapsulate this book's two central lines of inquiry. Spectacular Suffering focuses on moments of witnessing slavery in the long eighteenth century and the structures of sentimental affect that invariably attend these moments. First, my analysis approaches the problem of slavery as a problem of embodiment, evidenced both in Dickson's visceral response to the scarred, fettered slave and in Equiano's rage against the potential flogging he may receive. This foregrounding of bodily experience is a central element in sentimental representations of slave distress, since the two features of Atlantic slavery-commodification and punishment-are fundamentally concerned with the transformations of the body, with the subjection of the raced body to the regimes of the market and to plantation discipline. From its inception, the Atlantic slave trade and mercantile capital transformed persons into things, human beings into commodities, singular selves into exchangeable units. Plantation slavery, in turn, intensified the commodifying operations of the slave trade by turning captive Africans into fungible possessions, depriving the enslaved of any rights to their bodies. As the episodes from Sloane and Dickson reveal, West Indian slave laws categorized Africans as their master's property, granting the latter virtually unlimited punitive power. The movement of sympathetic feeling is frequently a direct corollary of the objectifying operations of mercantile capital, on one hand, and the exercise of slaveholder disciplinary authority, on the other. It is by counterposing the singular body to the abstract commodity, the particular to the typical, and taking affective property in the slaves in opposition to the claims of legal proprietorship assumed by the slaveholders that metropolitan observers such as Dickson registered their disquiet over enslavement.

#### Their evidence agrees

(1AC Autumn A. and Jennifer D., at the University of Pennsylvania, and University of Maryland, “Toward a pedagogy of Black livingness: Black students’ creative multimodal renderings of resistance to anti-Blackness”, <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ETPC-09-2020-0123/full/html>, accessed 9/3/2021) KD3C

To discuss Black Livingness, we must first engage a brief discussion of Afro Pessimism and Anti-Blackness, as the former is a direct response to the latter two. Theorists of Afro Pessimism contend that the existence of Black folks in the USA will forever be marred by the period of US enslavement (Bilge, 2020; Hartman, 1997; Sexton, 2016). Because this country was built on the vicious genocide of Indigenous people and the brutal forced labor of enslaved Africans, the history of the USA set the precedent for Black people to be perceived as distinctively non-human (Douglass et al., 2018) and thus to be the recipients of seemingly justifiable neglect, surveillance and violence (Warren and Coles, 2020). Thus, the current social positioning of Black Americans in the USA is evidence of what Hartman (2008) terms the afterlife of slavery. Although the physical scars of enslavement are no longer visible, the institution and its legacy live on through state-sanctioned violence against Black bodies, minds and spirits (Warren and Coles, 2020). This contemporary anti-Blackness is perpetuated in daily life generally as well as in elementary and secondary schools, specifically (Dumas, 2014). While historically, Black people were legally barred from receiving an education, contemporary schooling systems feed Black students false neoliberal narratives with the intention of quelling resistance, progress, imagination and liberation (Givens, 2016). In this regard, these systems uphold white knowledge and claim curricula as white property, effectively silencing, erasing and banning Black history, culture and knowledge from schools (Griffin and James, 2018). Literacy curricula in particular have long been claimed as white property. To begin, because literacy is a distinctly human concept, it has, both historically and contemporarily, been used to bestow humanity upon or withhold humanity from varied groups of racially marginalized people (Ladson-Billings, 1992). These curricula often focus so closely on monolithic school-based notions of literacy at the expense of incorporating the varied literacy practices of Black students that by relying on it, some educators intentionally and strategically belittle and erase the contributions, experiences, and knowledge of Black folks. In doing so, they silence Black students, making classrooms more closely resemble containment facilities than spaces where creativity and innovation are allowed to flourish (Brown, 2013;Dumas, 2014; Griffin and James, 2018), causing Black students’ creativity and literacies to suffer in these classrooms. This type of curricular violence (Jones, 2020) subjects Black students to racial trauma and effectively accomplishes what Love (2019) deems to as spirit murdering, which refers to the robbing of both humanity and dignity. Indeed, it is through these violent curricular acts that literacy teachers wield instruction and curricula as weapons and remain complicit in the perpetual enslavement of Black bodies and minds. Through the employment of anti-Black rhetoric, policies and instruction, schools and curriculum kill the hopes, dreams and potential of Black students often before they are able to realize those dreams for themselves.

#### Horizontalism Link---ensuring community survival and care thru local linkages locks in a bourgeois ideology that serves as a salve for the crisis of capital---kills momentum for vertical organizing to seize the state

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But while these experiments with horizontalism brought about a number of achievements, its experience also revealed several further problems. Principal among these is the limitations faced by neighbourhood assemblies as an organisational form. Modelled on horizontalist principles, the neighbourhood assemblies arose in response to the immediate needs and possibilities opened up by the crisis. Like the general assembly of Occupy, they enabled people to have a newfound voice. But even when joined together in inter-neighbourhood assemblies, they never approached the point of replacing the state, or of being able to present themselves as a viable alternative. The functions of the state – welfare, healthcare, redistribution, education, and so on – were not about to be replaced by the horizontalist movement, even at its height of participation. It thus remained a localised response to the crisis. Further limitations surfaced as these assemblies could only function by either rejecting organised – which is to say, collective – interests, or incorporating them, and thus being overwhelmed.63 Collective interests were incapable of being brought into the decision-making process without breaking it, since they often took control over discussion and debate. Problematically, these assemblies operated best on an individualistic basis.

Other organisational experiments in Argentina involved the spread of worker-controlled factories. In the wake of the economic crisis, some shuttered businesses were taken over and maintained by their employees. These factories helped to keep workers in jobs, and there is some evidence that they provided better pay for their workers. Unfortunately, despite the attention given to them, the total number of people involved was relatively small: in the most optimistic estimates, there were around 250 factories incorporating just under 10,000 workers.64 With a labour force of over 18 million, this means far less than 0.1 per cent of the economy was participating in worker-controlled factories. Not only were these factories a minor part of the overall economy, but they also remained necessarily embedded within capitalist social relations. The dream of escape is just that: a dream. Tied to the imperative to create a profit, worker-controlled businesses can be just as oppressive and environmentally damaging as any large-scale business, but without the efficiencies of scale. Such problems are widespread across the worker-cooperative experience, having arisen not only in Argentina, but also in the Zapatista model and across America.

Beyond these organisational limits, the key problem with Argentina as a model for postcapitalism is that it was simply a salve for the problems of capitalism, not an alternative to it. As the economy started to improve, participation in the neighbourhood assemblies and alternative economies drastically declined.66 The post-crisis horizontalist movements in Argentina were built as an emergency response to the collapse of the existing order, not as a competitor to a relatively well-functioning order. Indeed, the more widespread problem with contemporary horizontalism is that it often sees emergency situations – in the wake of a hurricane, earthquake or economic meltdown – as representative of a better world.67 It is a struggle, to say the least, to see how post-disaster conditions are an improvement for the vast majority of the world’s population. A politics that finds its best expression in the breakdown of social and economic order is not an alternative, so much as a knee-jerk survival instinct. Equally problematic is the tendency for horizontalists to find political potential in the mundane ways we organise horizontally in everyday life – friends gathering together, parties, festivals, and so on.68 The problem is that such modes of organising are not scalable beyond a small community – and, more to the point, are not useful for certain political goals. As the Argentinean example shows, these modes of organising can be valuable for basic neighbourhood survival and for creating a sense of solidarity between people. But horizontalism struggles to compete against more organised interests, to sustain itself once a base level of normality returns, and to achieve long-term and large-scale political goals such as providing universal healthcare, high-level education and social security. These approaches remain useful in exceptional circumstances and for a small range of goals, but they will neither revolutionise society nor genuinely threaten global capitalism.

In the case of both neighbourhood assemblies and worker-controlled factories, we see that the primary organisational models of horizontalism are insufficient. They are often reactive tactics that fail to compete in the antagonistic environment of global capitalism. On a theoretical level, and in the actual experiences of Occupy and Argentina, the limits of horizontalism have repeatedly been made clear over the past decade. While recognising the important capacity of horizontalist tactics to provide small-scale support to communities and to temporarily disrupt certain exploitative practices, the commitment to fetishised versions of consensus, direct action, and particularly prefigurative politics, constrains the possibilities of expanding and overtaking existing social systems.